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
 
Bangladesh‟s transition to a higher growth trajectory since the early 1990s 
has been accompanied by increasing inequality of income. In particular, the 
gap between the richest ten per cent and the poorest forty per cent of the 
population has steadily widened. The present paper argues that growth 
acceleration and rising inequality are essentially two sides of the same coin - 
in the sense that the forces that have contributed to growth acceleration are 
also the ones that have engendered rising inequality. An important causal 
mechanism underlying both sides of the coin is the fact that growth of real 
wages has lagged behind growth in labour productivity. This has, on the one 
hand, reduced the real cost of labour which has contributed to growth 
acceleration by improving Bangladesh‟s competitiveness in the world market 
and thereby spurring an export-oriented growth process. On the other hand, it 
has reduced the share of labour and raised the share of non-labour factors of 
production in national output, resulting in a shift in the functional distribution 
of income against labour. Since the poorer segment of the society depends 
more on labour income (wage- or self-employed) and the richer segment 
depends more on the returns from non-labour factors such as land and capital, 
the anti-labour shift in the functional distribution of income has resulted in 
rising inequality in personal income distribution as well. Yet another 
mechanism underlying the two sides of the coin is the phenomenal growth in 
foreign remittance which has spurred economic growth on the one hand and 
contributed to rising inequality on the other. Although inequality is rising 
because of the growth process itself, the solution does not lie in reversing the 
growth process or in abandoning the current sources of growth. Rather the 
solution lies in ensuring broad-based access to the opportunities being opened 
up by the growth process. One of the implications of this analysis is that a 
necessary precondition for linking growth with equity in Bangladesh is to 
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ensure greater social protection and greater equality in human capital. The 
evidence presented in this paper show, however, that this precondition is far 
from being fulfilled. On the contrary, there is clear evidence that inequality in 
the distribution of human capital is not only high but also increasing over 
time, which does not portend well for the prospects of achieving equitable 
growth in the future. 
Keywords: Growth-Equity Nexus, Equitable Growth, Palma Ratio, Human Capital, 
Social Protection 
JEL Classification: O11, O15, O53, P46 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The concern with equity has emerged strongly in recent global debates on 
economic progress. This has happened partly in recognition of the fact that in 
spite of great strides made by the world in recent times in promoting growth of 
incomes and ensuring higher standards of living across the globe (the setback 
caused by the recent financial crisis notwithstanding), inequality between and 
within nations has not diminished. In fact, it has increased in many parts of the 
world, especially in the developed world and in some major developing countries 
that have been enjoying rapid pace of growth.
1
 In part, the increasing concern 
with equity has also emerged in the context of discussion of the post-MDG 
agenda as many participants in these discussions have noted with dismay that the 
original concern with equity as enshrined in the Millennium Declaration has 
somehow got lost in the specificities of target-setting.
2
 A vigorous advocacy 
campaign has been launched to introduce the goal of inequality reduction as a 
core element of the post-MDG agenda. 
This global concern with equity finds echo in the local discourse on political 
economy in Bangladesh as well. As growth has picked up over the last two 
decades, and brought poverty down in its wake, observers have noted with 
dismay that inequality has remained stubbornly high and if anything is getting 
even higher. The present paper seeks to contribute to this discourse by 
unravelling the nature of the growth-equity nexus in Bangladesh. As a prelude to 
the discussion of the specific experience of Bangladesh, we begin by reviewing 
the academic literature on the theory and empirics of the relationship between 
growth and equality in section II. In section III, we undertake an in-depth 
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analysis of the relationship between growth and distribution in Bangladesh, 
trying to understand the processes that underlie the growth-equity nexus. Our 
analysis reveals that growth acceleration and rising inequality are essentially two 
sides of the same coin - in the sense that the forces that have contributed to 
growth acceleration are also the ones that have engendered rising inequality. An 
important causal mechanism underlying both sides of the coin is the fact that 
growth of real wages has lagged behind growth in labour productivity. This has, 
on the one hand, reduced the real cost of labour which has contributed to growth 
acceleration by improving Bangladesh‟s competitiveness in the world market and 
thereby spurring an export-oriented growth process. On the other hand, it has 
reduced the share of labour and raised the share of non-labour factors of 
production in national output, resulting in a shift in the functional distribution of 
income against labour. Since the poorer segment of the society depends more on 
labour income (wage or self-employed) and the richer segment depends more on 
the returns from non-labour factors such as land and capital, the anti-labour shift 
in functional distribution of income has resulted in rising inequality in personal 
income distribution as well. An important implication of this analysis is that a 
necessary precondition for linking growth with equity in Bangladesh is to ensure 
greater social protection on the one hand and greater equality in the formation of 
human capital on the other. From that perspective, section IV evaluates the 
existing social protection system in Bangladesh, section V examines recent 
trends in the distribution of health outcomes between the rich and the poor, and 
section VI does the same for educational outcomes. Our analysis of the empirical 
evidence presented in these sections points to the disconcerting conclusion that 
the necessary precondition for linking growth with equity is far being fulfilled. 
Section VII summarises the main findings and draws out some of the policy 
implications. 
II. THE GROWTH-EQUITY NEXUS: TWO-WAY CAUSATION 
The relationship between growth and equity is characterised by two-way 
causation. The rate and process of growth may shape the evolving pattern of 
inequality, and the existing pattern of inequality may in turn affect the prospects 
for growth. For almost the whole of the second half of the twentieth century, the 
economics profession, to the extent it considered the relationship between growth 
and equity at all, focussed almost exclusively on the first line of causation - 
running from growth to inequality. Since the 1990s, with the emergence of 
endogenous growth theory, attention has shifted decisively towards the line of 
reverse causation – running from inequality to growth. 
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Following the seminal work of Simon Kuznets (1955), the causal relationship 
running from growth to inequality has been characterised as an inverted U-
relationship, where inequality first rises with growth and subsequently falls as a 
country becomes richer. This relationship has been the intellectual foundation of 
a view often expressed in the early development literature that it is normal for 
inequality to rise in the early stage of development – one must be patient and 
wait for a country to develop before seeking to create a more equal society. Much 
work has been done to explain this alleged “law” of development and to test its 
empirical validity. 
Kuznets himself offered an explanation of rising inequality in the early stage 
of development in terms of inter-sectoral migration. He assumed that rural 
inequality was lower than urban inequality. This implied that as labour migrated 
from rural to urban areas in the early stage of development, the high-inequality 
urban sector‟s weight in the national economy increased, resulting in rising 
inequality at the national level. An even more popular explanation was based on 
the celebrated surplus labour model of Arthur Lewis (1954). In the early stage of 
development, industrial development proceeds by employing surplus labour. So 
long as the pool of surplus labour exists, workers do not experience any rise in 
wages but the profits and incomes of the owners of capital soar, resulting in 
growing inequality. 
Despite the apparent plausibility of these explanations, for Kuznets himself, 
the inverted U-relationship was nothing more than a hypothesis - one that has 
come to be known as the Kuznets hypothesis - as he had only very skimpy data 
on which to base his conclusions. The first serious attempt to test the empirical 
validity of the hypothesis was made in the 1970s. Since then, a huge literature 
has developed on this subject, but often reaching completely opposite 
conclusions. This is not the occasion to attempt a threadbare critical review of 
this literature, but in view of the subject‟s relevance for the current concerns with 
linking growth with equity in Bangladesh, it is necessary to distil the main 
findings of this line of research. In our view, the following observations fairly 
summarise the current state of knowledge. 
Early cross-sectional studies based on cross-country regressions found strong 
support for the inverted U-curve, reinforcing the view that as a poor country 
embarks on the growth path inequality must get worse first before it can get 
better (Adelman and Morris 1973, Paukert 1973, Ahluwalia 1976, Robinson 
1976). But these studies were soon challenged on several grounds. It was pointed 
out, for example, that the findings were not robust to alternative specifications of 
the relationship between inequality and growth and to the use of alternative 
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estimation techniques. When equally plausible specifications and estimation 
techniques are applied to the same data, the Kuznets relationship could not be 
found (Anand and Kanbur 1993a, 1993b). Questions were also raised about the 
consistency of data since different countries collected distributional data and 
measured inequalities in ways that were not always consistent with each other. A 
series of studies based on more consistent data sets came to the conclusion that 
there was no evidence for the Kuznets curve from cross-sectional data (Fields 
2001). More recently, Palma (2011) has pointed out that the cross-sectional 
inverted-U has completely disappeared from the scene as inequality has increased 
at both ends of the income scale across countries resulting in a convergence of 
inequality (around a Gini coefficient of 0.40) for countries at very different levels 
of per capita income. 
More fundamental questions were raised about the relevance of the cross-
sectional studies for the question at stake, namely, whether inequality increases 
within countries, when per capita income begins to rise. This question cannot be 
answered by observing whether inequality rises across countries as one moves 
from a poorer country to the richer ones, because of the possible influence of 
country-specific factors. Time series data were needed for answering the 
question, but such data were not available in the early days of the debate. 
Eventually panel data across countries became available, and when these data 
were analysed after controlling for country-specific effects, again there was no 
evidence for the general tendency that inequality tends to rise in the early stage of 
development (Deininger and Squire 1998, Savvidesa and Stengos 2000, Barro 
2000, 2008).
3
 The general conclusion that has emerged is that there is no 
systematic relationship between growth and inequality - indeed, there are about 
as many instances of inequality rising as there are instances of inequality falling 
with growth (Ravallion 2001). 
Despite this conclusion emerging from cross-country regressions, lingering 
questions remain when one examines the experience of specific countries 
embarking on the growth path. It has been noted, in particular, that inequality has 
actually worsened in all the Asian countries that have moved on to a higher 
growth path in the recent years - for example, in China, Vietnam and India. The 
spectre of Kuznets is once again raising its head.
4
 Even one of the most well-
known critics of the early evidence for the Kuznets curve (based on cross-
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sectional studies) has expressed the view that when one takes the country case 
study approach one cannot but suspect that Kuznets still matters (Kanbur 2012). 
It is important to consider, however, exactly in what sense Kuznets still 
matters if he indeed does. The most logical interpretation would be that if the 
market is left to itself there might be a natural tendency for inequality to rise 
along with growth in the early stage of development.
5
 But this does not mean that 
rising inequality has to be taken as an irrevocable “law of development” that is 
impervious to policy. There is no reason in principle why the “natural” tendency 
of the market cannot be countered by conscious policy to make growth more 
equitable. Numerous studies of the East Asian “miracle” economies have shown 
how policies played a critical role in helping them combine growth with equity in 
the 1960s and 1970s.
6
 More recently, similar evidence is emerging from Latin 
America, which has historically contained some of the most unequal societies on 
earth. Reversing the historical pattern, most of these countries have successfully 
reduced inequality in the decade of the 2000s, even as inequality was rising in 
emerging Asia. Policies once again played the critical role in countering the 
natural tendency of the market. Of particular importance were policies aimed at 
promoting mass education and massive redistribution policies aimed at building 
broad-based human capital (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010, Lustig, Lopez-Calva 
and Ortiz-Juarez 2011).  
But the argument that policies can reverse the natural tendency of the market 
begs an important question: what if the attempt to reduce inequality also results 
in slower growth? In trying to combine growth with equity, would not we end up 
with equitable but slow growth? In other words, is not there a trade-off between 
equity and growth? In order to address this question, we need to examine the 
other side of the two-way causation between growth and inequality - namely, the 
causation running from inequality to growth. What is the effect of inequality on 
growth, or, more specifically, is equality bad for growth? 
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positions of some of the lower groups more rapidly than opportunities elsewhere in the 
economy may be created for them.” (pp. 24-25). In a similar vein, Arthur Lewis (1976) 
contended that “Development must be inegalitarian because it does not start in every part 
of the economy at the same time.... There may be one such enclave in an economy, or 
several; but at the start development enclaves include only a small minority of the 
population.” (p.26) 
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Osmani: The Growth-Equity Nexus in Bangladesh 7 
Economists have identified a number of channels through which inequality 
may affect growth - some positively, some negatively. The channel that 
dominated thinking until recently is the savings channel, which suggests the 
existence of a positive relationship between inequality and growth. This 
argument is based on the assumption commonly made by the classical 
economists that the richer people have a higher marginal propensity to save than 
the poorer people. For any given level of per capita income, higher inequality 
will therefore mean that the distribution is tilted towards those who save a higher 
proportion of income. Thus aggregate savings will be higher in a more unequal 
society; and in so far as savings drive investment and growth, growth will also be 
higher. 
Contrary to this traditional view, a new body of research has emerged since 
the 1990s which argues that there exist other causal mechanisms that can 
generate a negative relationship between inequality and growth. Although there 
are important nuances and qualifications in the findings of this new line of 
research, its general conclusion has been encapsulated in the phrase that 
“inequality is bad for growth” as against the traditional view based on the savings 
channel which tended to regard inequality as good for growth. At least three 
different channels have been identified through which inequality can exert a 
negative influence on growth. These can be described as: the imperfect credit 
market channel, the fiscal policy channel, and the socio-economic instability 
channel.
7
 
The essential idea behind the imperfect credit market channel is that in the 
presence of credit market imperfections people will be credit-constrained to 
varying degrees; faced with these constraints they will not be able to undertake 
all the socially profitable projects for investment in physical and human capital; 
as a result growth will suffer. There are several strands of this line of argument. 
Beginning with the pioneering work of Galor and Zeira (1993) and Piketty 
(1997), one of these strands combines the implication of credit market 
imperfections with that of indivisibilities in investment. Imperfection in credit 
market entails that an individual‟s ability to undertake investment expenditure 
would be determined to a large extent by his initial wealth. Those who are 
endowed with high initial wealth are less likely to be credit-constrained than 
those with a low initial amount of wealth; as a result, the former will be able to 
undertake much bigger volume of investment than the latter. Indivisibility, on the 
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other hand, entails that a certain minimum level of expenditure must be incurred 
for an investment project to be undertaken, presumably because of the existence 
of fixed costs. Together, credit constraint and indivisibility imply that initially 
wealthy individuals will be better able to seize opportunities for profitable 
investment than the less wealthy individuals, because the latter will not have 
sufficient command over resources to meet the threshold level of investment. The 
more unequal a society is, the higher will be the proportion of people with lower 
initial wealth, other things remaining the same. As a result, the greater will be the 
number of investment opportunities that will be have to be foregone because of 
the inability to meet the investment threshold, and hence slower will be the rate 
of growth. Higher inequality will thus lead to slower growth. 
Another strand of argument based on the idea of credit market imperfections 
focuses on parental decisions on the level of fertility and children‟s schooling, 
especially on the joint nature of these two decisions (e.g., Galor and Zang 1997, 
Dahan and Tsiddon 1998). Prospects for high returns to education may encourage 
all parents to invest more on children‟s education, and also to reduce fertility at 
the same time since educating children can be costly. But only the initially 
wealthy parents will be able to take these decisions because credit constraint is 
likely to less binding for them. By contrast, the initially less wealthy parents, for 
whom credit constraint is likely to more binding, may not have enough resources 
to pay for the fixed cost of education. And if they cannot educate their children - 
and thus do not have to incur the cost of education - they will be less inclined to 
restrict the size of the family. In fact, they might be more inclined to have more 
children who can be useful for augmenting the income of the household at very 
little cost. The more unequal a society is, the greater will be the number of such 
parents with lower initial wealth facing binding credit constraint; therefore, the 
lower will be the creation of human capital and the higher will be the level of 
fertility. The consequence of both low level of human capital formation and high 
level of fertility will be slower growth. 
The arguments based on the fiscal policy channel rest on a political decision-
making mechanism of majority voting and its effects on fiscal policy as the main 
process for generating a systematic relationship between inequality and growth. 
The early models, developed, for example, by Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and 
Persson and Tabellini (1994), suggested that the fiscal policy channel will 
generate a negative relationship between inequality and growth. The argument is 
composed of two parts: (a) a more unequal society will generate stronger 
pressure for redistribution from the rich to the poor, and (b) redistribution will 
hamper growth by distorting incentives for investment. 
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The first part of the argument is based on the idea of majority voting as 
embodied in the median voter theorem well-known in the public choice literature. 
In the simplest version of the model, the government imposes a proportional tax 
on capital and redistributes the proceeds uniformly among all members of the 
society in a lump sum manner. The implication of this type fiscal policy is that 
people with smaller capital will prefer a higher tax rate than people with larger 
capital. At the same time, a government that wants to maximise revenue while 
keeping the majority of voters happy will impose a tax rate that equals the 
preferred tax rate of the median voter. This is because everyone with less than 
median capital will be happy with this tax rate because they would have been 
willing to opt for an even higher rate in view of the negative association between 
ownership of capital and preferred tax rate mentioned earlier, and along with the 
median voter they constitute the majority. The chosen tax rate thus depends on 
the level of capital owned by the median voter. Now, the more unequal the 
distribution of capital is for any given average level of capital, the lower will be 
the amount of capital owned by the median voter - the higher will be his 
preferred tax rate and thus higher will be tax rate chosen by the government.
8
 
The second part of the argument is based on the idea that taxation and 
redistribution are harmful to growth because of their distortionary effects on 
investment incentives. Combining these two parts, one should expect a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth. 
The socio-political instability channel is yet another mechanism through 
which inequality is expected to exert a negative effect on long-term growth. This 
line of argument too is composed of two parts. The first part says that high 
inequality of income and wealth generates political instability,
9
 and the second 
part says that instability negatively affects investment and future growth. 
Together these two parts induce a negative relationship between inequality and 
growth. 
The existence of multiple channels through which inequality can in principle 
affect growth creates difficulties in arriving at a firm theoretical conclusion about 
the relationship. The problem is not just that the savings channel pulls in one 
direction and the other three channels pull in the opposite direction; even the 
predictions of the other three channels are not always unambiguous if they are 
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Perotti (1996) describes this as the endogenous fiscal policy model since the tax rate 
chosen by the government depends on the distribution of capital which is itself affected 
by government policies. 
9
Keefer and Knack (2002) discuss several mechanisms through which inequality may 
generate socio-political stability. 
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considered jointly rather than in isolation. Consider, for example, the fiscal 
policy channel in which the second part of the argument asserts that 
redistribution will adversely affect growth by distorting incentives. But distortion 
of incentive is just one possible impact of distribution. If one also brings along 
the idea of credit market imperfections, it would be plausible to argue that 
redistribution will promote growth by allowing the credit-constraint poor people 
to invest more. Furthermore, even the first part of the argument, which contends 
that greater inequality entails higher taxation and greater redistribution, cannot be 
taken for granted. As pointed out by Bénabou (2000), in many countries the 
correlation between inequality and redistributive policies is opposite to the one 
predicted by the “traditional view” because of the presence of “wealth bias”, 
which refers to the idea that the rich has a disproportionately bigger influence on 
fiscal decisions (through lobbying, campaign contributions, greater propensity to 
vote, and so forth) than what is suggested by the median voter theorem. Once the 
effect of wealth bias is combined with credit market imperfections, all kinds of 
possibilities emerge in the fiscal policy channel, some which generate a negative 
relationship between inequality and growth but some positive, depending on the 
balance of incentive distortions and credit constraints (Galor and Moav 2004). 
A further complication arises from the possibility that different channels may 
dominate under different circumstances, which may include initial distribution of 
income and wealth, the nature of political regime, and stage of a country‟s 
development. For example, Galor and Moav (2004) propose a model in which the 
saving channel is dominant in the early stage of development, when physical 
capital is scarce and its accumulation is the main engine of development, 
implying a positive effect of inequality on growth. As countries continue to 
develop and physical capital becomes relatively abundant, human capital begins 
to play a much bigger role and that is when the credit market channel comes of 
its own, generating a negative relationship between inequality and growth. In 
even later stages of development, when household incomes become sufficiently 
high the credit constraints cease to be a serious impediment to human capital 
formation. At that stage, there ceases to exist any relationship between inequality 
and growth. 
Finally, one may also need to distinguish between short run and long run 
effects. Certain channels may be more effective in the short to medium run - for 
example, the savings channel and the fiscal policy channel. By contrast, the 
channels through which imperfect credit market affects the formation of human 
capital and the channel of socio-political instability may be more relevant in the 
longer run. 
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In view of these theoretical ambiguities, it is no surprise that empirical 
attempts to discern a systematic relationship between inequality and growth have 
come up with few definitive results. Further difficulties with the empirical studies 
are that while trying to discern the impact of inequality on growth one has to 
contend with the reverse causation from growth to inequality that underlies the 
Kuznets curve discussed earlier. Econometric techniques exist that can in 
principle disentangle the two lines of causation, but the kind of data that are 
necessary to implement those techniques are hard to find. For these reasons, it is 
difficult to make strong empirical generalisations.
10
 Nonetheless, after careful 
scrutiny of the available evidence, Neves and Silva (2014) arrive at the tentative 
conclusion that the negative effect of inequality on growth is perhaps more 
dominant in developing countries. As they observe: “The development level is 
particularly relevant, as most studies have shown that the inequality-growth 
effect is negative in developing economies and insignificant or even positive in 
developed countries.” (p.13) 
To conclude, when one combines the theoretical and empirical findings on 
the two-way causation between growth and inequality, very little ground is found 
for persisting with the traditional view that one must accept rising inequality in 
the early stages of growth. It is of course possible that if left to itself market may 
generate forces that aggravate inequality as the process of development sets off. 
But there is no inexorable law that ordains that this must happen. Experience 
shows that the “natural” tendency of the market can be successfully contained, 
even reversed, with appropriate policy interventions. Furthermore, there is no 
definitive reason to fear that attempts to reduce inequality will involve a trade-off 
with growth; in other words, policy-induced equity need not come at the expense 
of growth. On the contrary, for developing countries in particular, greater equity 
may in fact induce faster growth, thereby inducing a virtuous circle between 
equity and growth. 
Finally, it must be recognised that even if the attempt to ensure greater equity 
hampers growth to some extent - which may indeed happen in certain 
circumstances - this needs not be taken as a decisive argument against equity. 
After all, people value equity for its intrinsic worth - out of a concern for justice 
and fairness, not just for its instrumental role in influencing the pace and pattern 
of growth. Therefore, even if the pursuit of equity does involve some trade-off 
with growth, the society might well decide to improve equity at the cost of some 
growth, provided the loss of growth is not of a precipitous nature. 
                                                 
10
For comprehensive review of the available evidence, see Ehrhart (2009) and Neves and 
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III. GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION: THE BANGLADESH EXPERIENCE 
The first two decades after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971 were the 
most difficult times in the country‟s economic history. The 1970s passed by in 
trying to recover from the ravages of war, cyclones, floods and famine, and the 
1980s were devoted to consolidating the success in recovery and reconstruction. 
Throughout this period, economic growth remained slow, as GDP grew at less 
the 4 per cent per annum, while population growth remained relatively high – at 
more than 2 per cent. As a result, per capita income grew only very slowly – at 
just over 1.5 per cent annum. There was a mild improvement in the growth of per 
capita income in the 1980s, but this was due entirely to slowdown in population 
growth and owed nothing to growth of GDP which remained virtually trendless. 
It was only at the turn of the 1990s that GDP growth embarked on a rising 
trajectory, and the trend has continued to date, taking Bangladesh economy to a 
substantially higher growth path. Growth of GDP accelerated from about 3.7 per 
cent in the first two decades to 4.8 per cent in the 1990s and further to 5.8 per 
cent in the 2000s (Table I). The growth spurt, in combination with continued 
slowdown in population growth, has resulted in a fairly rapid increase in per 
capita income. In the 1990s, per capita income grew at the rate of 3 per cent per 
annum, which amounted to a near doubling of the growth rate of the preceding 
two decades, and in the 2000s it grew even faster, at 4.4 per cent per annum.
11
 
While this performance was not nearly as strong as in some of the East and 
Southeast Asian countries during the same period, it was still a remarkable 
achievement by historical standards and also quite impressive in comparison with 
the developing world as a whole. 
TABLE I 
DECADAL GROWTH RATES: 1970S TO 2000S 
(per cent per annum) 
 
1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
GDP growth 3.79 3.72 4.80 5.82 
Population growth 2.40 2.01 1.70 1.32 
Per capita GDP growth 1.39 1.68 3.05 4.44 
Notes: (1) Data refer to the average of annual figures for each period. 
 (2) The 1970s refers to the period 1972/73 to 1979/80. 
Source: Calculated from time series data compiled by the author from various statistical publications of the 
Government of Bangladesh and the World Bank, after making necessary adjustments for 
comparability, to the extent possible. 
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There has been further acceleration in growth since 2010, as GDP growth has averaged 
at more than 6 per cent in the years from 2010-11 to 2013-14, with per capita GDP 
growth just crossing the 5 per cent mark. 
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As the economy is currently trying to meet the challenges of an even faster 
growth in the coming years, a new challenge has meanwhile emerged that has 
become a matter of grave concern. It relates to the distribution of the gains from 
growth: as economic growth has accelerated since the early 1990s the personal 
distribution of income has become more unequal. According to official figures, 
the degree of income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, has 
increased from an average of 0.38 in the 1980s to 0.44 in the 1990s and further to 
0.46 in the 2000s (Table II). Thus while the average living standard is rising 
faster than ever, the gap between the rich and the poor is also widening faster 
than before. In this regard, Bangladesh‟s experience is similar to most other 
rapidly growing economies in Asia, which are also witnessing widening 
inequality along with rapid growth. However, as noted earlier in the paper, there 
is nothing inevitable about rising inequality being combined with rapid growth, 
as the early experience of the East Asian countries showed (in the 1960s and 
1970s) and as the recent Latin American experience also confirms (in the 2000s). 
 TABLE II  
DECADAL AVERAGE OF INCOME GINI COEFFICIENT: 
1980S TO 2000S 
(per cent) 
 
1980s 1990s 2000s 
National 0.377 0.442 0.463 
Rural 0.361 0.389 0.430 
Urban 0.380 0.471 0.475 
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Surveys of the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics (various rounds). 
Before examining the nature and causes of rising inequality, a couple of 
apparently odd features of the available statistics on inequality need to be 
commented upon. The first oddity relates to income inequality in urban 
Bangladesh. Detailed time series data show that urban income inequality has 
apparently declined in the 2000s after rising in the 1990s. Thus, the income Gini 
went up from 0.40 in 1991/92 to 0.44 in 1995/96 and further to 0.50 in 2000, but 
that is where the rising trend stopped. In 2005, the Gini coefficient remained at 
0.50 and by 2000 it seems to have fallen to 0.45. If these statistics are to be taken 
at face value, they would imply that whatever forces had caused urban inequality 
to widen as growth accelerated for the first time in the 1990s either ceased to 
exist or were neutralised by some countervailing forces in the 2000s when 
growth accelerated even more. As we shall see, however, there are good reasons 
not to take these figures at their face value. 
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The second oddity relates to the distribution of consumption expenditure as 
distinct from the distribution of income. Official figures show that after rising in 
the first half of the 1990s, inequality in consumption at the national level has 
remained more or less constant since 1995-96. In the rural areas, the consumption 
Gini has hovered around 0.27, while in urban areas it appears to have declined 
slightly from 0.36 in 1995/96 to 0.34 in 2010 (Table III). Of the two, the urban 
figures are easier to explain. Since official statistics show a slight decline in 
income inequality in urban areas in the 2000s, a corresponding reduction in 
consumption inequality is at least consistent. As we shall argue below, official 
figures of urban income inequality underestimate the degree of inequality; if so, 
they are very likely to underestimate consumption inequality as well. It is, 
therefore, no surprise that consumption inequality will be found to decline in 
urban areas along with a decline in income inequality. The real oddity relates to 
the rural figures. According to the official estimates, rural income inequality has 
increased consistently from 1991/92 to 2010 (Table II), and yet rural 
consumption inequality has remained virtually constant since 1995/96 (Table III). 
This apparent disjuncture between income and consumption inequality in rural 
Bangladesh clearly calls for some explanation. 
TABLE III 
CONSUMPTION INEQUALITY: GINI COEFFICIENT 
(per cent) 
 
National Rural Urban 
1991-92 0.259 0.243 0.307 
1995-96 0.302 0.265 0.363 
2000 0.307 0.271 0.368 
2005 0.310 0.278 0.353 
2010 0.320 0.275 0.338 
Source: World Bank (2002, 2008, 2013a). 
We shall first comment on the second oddity, which is related to inequality in 
rural consumption, before returning to the first, which is related to income 
inequality and is closer to our main concern in this paper. 
The first point to note about the disjuncture between income and 
consumption inequality is that it is entirely plausible for consumption inequality 
to rise less than income inequality. The reason lies in the well-known fact that the 
marginal propensity to consume is lower at higher levels of income; as a result, 
even as the income gap between the rich and the poor widens, the consumption 
gap may not widen as much. But that alone cannot explain why consumption 
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inequality should not change at all when income gap widens. For that to happen, 
it is not enough that the propensity to consume is higher at the bottom end of the 
scale than at the top at any point in time; the propensity to consume will have to 
rise over time at the bottom end of the scale and/or fall over time at the top end, 
so that the relative consumption distribution may remain unchanged in the face of 
rising income inequality. A recent study of rural income inequality has 
demonstrated that the former has actually happened – i.e., the propensity to 
consume at the bottom end of the scale has risen over the decade of the 2000s 
(Osmani and Sen 2011).  
The same study also offers an explanation of why this has happened and 
provides evidence in its support. The explanation lies in the rapid growth of 
microfinance in rural Bangladesh, which has resulted in some relaxation of the 
liquidity constraint faced by poor consumers. The argument goes as follows. The 
consumption behaviour that was observed in 2000 was heavily conditioned by 
the stringent liquidity constraint that the poor people had to face. Due to this 
constraint, when some of the poor people faced a negative income shock and 
their actual income fell below “permanent income”, they could not maintain the 
„desired‟ level of consumption by borrowing against better times that was 
required by the logic of inter-temporal consumption smoothing. The following 
decade has witnessed an explosion of microfinance that has resulted in a 
significant easing of the liquidity constraint faced by the rural poor. As a result, 
poor people who end up with unusually low incomes because of negative income 
shocks can now get closer to the “optimum” level of borrowing and maintain 
their consumption level in line with permanent income. In other words, in earlier 
times the binding liquidity constraint kept the propensity to consume at the 
bottom end of the income scale at an artificially low level; with the relaxation of 
the liquidity constraint the propensity to consume has now gone up closer to the 
optimum level. That is why consumption distribution has not worsened even as 
income inequality has.
12
 
                                                 
12
It should be noted that this explanation does not imply that microfinance borrowers are 
sustaining higher consumption by accumulating debts over time because the argument 
does not rest on the idea of permanent or repeated borrowing. On the contrary, the 
scenario being envisaged is one where only people with temporarily low incomes (i.e., 
lower than “permanent income”) borrow in order to maintain their “normal” level of 
consumption, repaying the loan in good times; so, the question of accumulating debt over 
time does not arise. For further elaboration of this argument, see Osmani and Sen (2011), 
footnote 30. 
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The resulting stability in consumption distribution, combined with rapid 
growth in per capita income, has led to in an impressive rate of poverty reduction 
in rural Bangladesh in the 2000s, despite rising inequality.
13
 In other words, 
widening of income inequality has not posed an obstacle to poverty reduction in 
rural Bangladesh so far only because microfinance has served to decouple 
consumption distribution from income distribution, and it is the distribution of 
consumption that matters for poverty estimation. But this situation is likely to 
change. As soon as the expansion of microfinance slows down (if only because it 
might be approaching a saturation point) the decoupling will cease to exist, and 
consumption distribution will then begin to follow the path of income 
distribution. Rising income inequality will then certainly become an obstacle to 
poverty reduction. Thus, even though poverty is measured with reference to 
consumption levels, in the final analysis it is the distribution of income that 
matters. 
We may now return to the first oddity, which is indeed a matter of income 
distribution, related to urban Bangladesh. The basic problem is that the picture of 
stable or even falling inequality in urban Bangladesh as given by official 
statistics sits oddly with most people‟s perception based on direct experience. A 
common problem with all household surveys – on the basis of which data for 
income distribution is generated – is that they fail to adequately capture the 
situation of households at the two extremes of the income scale. As a result, if 
distribution is becoming unequal because it is the extremely rich people who are 
running away even further from the rest of the population, household surveys 
may not be able to capture this phenomenon even though perception based on 
experience might.
14
 Of course, perception, or even casual empiricism, by itself 
cannot serve as an adequate basis for overturning the evidence given by available 
statistics, but it can certainly provide a ground for questioning the evidence. In an 
                                                 
13
 According to official estimates, the incidence of rural poverty has declined from 52.3 
per cent in 2000 to 35.2 per cent in 2010 (BBS 2007a, 2012). 
14
This inability to capture by the very rich through household surveys is not unique to 
Bangladesh; it is a common problem everywhere including the developed world. 
Recently, in a seminal work on the developed countries and some of the large developing 
countries, Piketty (2014) has tried to overcome this problem by making use of data 
obtained from tax returns, and not surprisingly the results show a much sharper increase 
in inequality than what is revealed by household surveys. It is doubtful, however, whether 
the same methodology would serve well in Bangladesh given the scale of tax evasion that 
is suspected to exist in this country. 
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important study, Khan (2005) not only questioned the evidence, but also 
provided strong empirical support for overturning it.  
He showed that at least a part of the problem lay in the way income was 
officially measured from the data generated by the Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (HIES). The official estimates of income include elements 
that ideally should not be counted as income – for example, transfers of various 
kinds and revenue generated by sales of assets and liquidation of past savings. 
When income is recalculated in a theoretically more correct manner, urban 
inequality is found to have risen in the first half of the 2000s, instead of staying 
constant as shown by official statistics (Table IV). A similar exercise is not 
available for the survey of 2010, but one can expect the rising trend to have 
continued after 2005, contrary to the official picture of falling inequality, because 
the measurement problems with the earlier surveys that had kept the trend of 
rising inequality hidden from the view would have persisted in the 2010 report as 
well. 
TABLE IV 
ALTERNATIVE ESTIMATES OF INCOME INEQUALITY IN BANGLADESH 
(Gini coefficient; per cent) 
 
National Rural Urban 
HIES Khan HIES Khan HIES Khan 
1991-92 0.388 0.303 0.364 0.276 0.398 0.327 
1995-96 0.432 0.359 0.384 0.310 0.444 0.387 
2000 0.451 0.405 0.393 0.356 0.497 0.437 
2005 0.467 0.438 0.428 0.404 0.497 0.475 
Source: HIES data are from BBS and Khan data are from Khan (2005). 
There are also other grounds on which one can infer that the trend of rising 
inequality that started in the 1900s continued in the decade of the 2000s as well. 
One of them has to do with the measurement of inequality itself. Our discussion 
so far has relied exclusively on the Gini coefficient as the measure of inequality. 
Gini of course is the most popular and most widely used measure of inequality, 
partly because of its close association with the visually more intuitive Lorenz 
curve analysis of income distribution. But it has been well-known for a long time 
that one of the limitations of the Gini coefficient is that by construction it 
attaches more weight to the middle of the distribution than to the tails. This 
would not be a problem for comparison between distributions if the middle of the 
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distribution behaved in the same way as the tails – e.g., if any widening of the 
gap between the upper and lower tails was also accompanied by similar widening 
of the gap in the middle of the distribution. This is indeed the implicit assumption 
behind the widespread use of the Gini coefficient.  
But the path-breaking recent work by Gabriel Palma has seriously questioned 
the empirical basis of this assumption. In an influential study on income 
distribution for a large number of countries around the globe, he has 
demonstrated that the middle of the distribution does not generally behave in the 
same way as the tails (Palma 2011). In fact, one of the stylized facts that emerges 
from his studies is that the middle class – representing 50 per cent of the 
population belonging to the five deciles from the fifth to the ninth – manages to 
capture a fairly constant share of roughly 50 per cent of national income in most 
countries most of the time. It is the changing division of the remaining 50 per 
cent of national income between the bottom 40 per cent and the top 10 per cent of 
the population that drives the change in overall income distribution. Thus when 
income distribution worsens it is mainly because the share of the top t10 per cent 
goes up at the expense of the bottom 40 per cent, while the middle 50 per cent 
more or less hold on to their share. The changing pattern of income distribution 
thus essentially represents a struggle between the two tails of the distribution for 
sharing the half of national income that is not captured by the middle class. 
This finding has a clear implication for how best to measure the degree of 
income inequality. What one should look for is not a measure of overall 
distribution, such as the Gini coefficient, because the middle of the distribution 
does not change much anyway, but simply a measure of the gap between the two 
tails of the distribution because that‟s where changes mainly occur. The simplest 
such measure is the ratio between the income shares of the top 40 per cent and 
the bottom 10 per cent of the population. Some researchers have christened this 
ratio as the Palma ratio and advocated its use in preference to the Gini coefficient 
(e.g., Cobham and Sumner 2013a, 2013b). 
In Table V, we present some data in the spirit of Palma‟s analysis. A couple 
of important conclusions follow from this data. First, as measured by the Palma 
ratio, income inequality displays a secular tendency to rise over time – a 
tendency that continued into the decade of the 2000s. The income share of the 
top decile as a ratio of the share of the bottom deciles increased from 1.7 in the 
1980s to 2.1 in the 1990s and increased further to 2.6 in the following decade. 
Thus, contrary to the trend revealed by the Gini coefficient, inequality as 
measured by the Palma ratio has never stopped rising in the high growth period - 
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it increased both in the 1990s and in the 2000s. This is so even on the basis of the 
official estimates of income, without corrections of the kind made by Khan.  
TABLE V 
INCOME SHARE ANALYSIS: THE PALMA RATIO 
(per cent) 
Income share (%) 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Bottom 40% 18.22 16.30 14.34 
Middle 50% 51.53 49.72 48.92 
Top 10% 30.25 33.97 36.75 
Palma Ratio 1.66 2.08 2.56 
Notes: Palma ratio is the ratio of income shares of the top 10% and the bottom 40% of 
the population.  
Source: Household Income and Expenditure Surveys of the Bangladesh Bureau of 
Statistics (various rounds). 
The second interesting feature of the data is that they provide striking support 
to Palma‟s hypothesis that the middle 50 per cent of the population manage to 
cling on to almost half the national income even as income disparity widens. 
According to our data, the middle class did lose slightly, as their share fell from 
51.5 per cent in the 1980s to 48.9 per cent in the 2000s. But in proportionate 
terms this was nothing in comparison with the changes that occurred at the two 
ends of the distribution: the share of the top 10 per cent increased from 30.2 per 
cent to 36.7 per cent, while the share of the bottom 40 per cent fell from 18.2 per 
cent to 14.3 per cent. The phenomenon of rising inequality that we observe in 
Bangladesh today is clearly one that conforms to Palma‟s stylised fact – the very 
rich moving further away from the very poor, while the middle class manages to 
hold on to its ground. 
Another way of gauging what is happening to the gap between the rich and 
the poor is to study what economists call the functional distribution of income 
i.e., the distribution of income among the owners of factors of production such as 
land, labour and capital. For the classical economists such as Adam Smith, David 
Ricardo, Thomas Malthus and Karl Marx the study of distribution was just as 
important as the study of growth, but by distribution they invariably meant 
functional distribution of income. Of course, the ultimate goal was to understand 
the nature and evolution of distribution among persons but they realised that 
since personal distribution emerges out of functional distribution through the 
earnings of factors of production owned by the people, it is the latter that should 
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be the focus of theoretical analysis. Yet, for a very long time personal 
distribution of income has held the centre stage in the statistical – as distinct from 
theoretical – analysis of income distribution. But statistical analysis of personal 
income distribution, unless it is matched with an analysis of functional 
distribution, is essentially a-theoretical; it describes but does not explain what has 
been happening to the distribution of income. This realisation has recently led to 
a resurgence of interest in functional distribution, as it provides the necessary 
conceptual tools for interpreting the evolution of personal income distribution.
15
 
A practical problem in this line of research is that it is not always easy to 
obtain data on the ownership of factors of production, which is essential for 
mapping functional distribution into personal distribution of income. One way of 
dealing with this problem is to use rough indicators rather than to embark on a 
full-fledged analysis of functional distribution. An indicator that can be 
especially helpful in this regard is the share of labour in the growth of income. 
Since labour is the most important factor of production owned by the poor, 
evolution in the share of labour can reveal a great deal about the evolving share 
of the poor vis-à-vis the share of the rich in national income. The evolution in 
labour share can in turn be inferred by comparing the growth of real wage with 
the growth of labour productivity. If real wage and productivity grow at the same 
rate, the relative shares of labour and non-labour inputs (such as land and capital, 
including human capital) in national income will remain constant, and since 
labour input comes mostly from the poor and non-labour inputs mostly from the 
rich the personal distribution of income will also remain relatively stable. If, 
however, real wage grows more slowly than productivity, this would lead to 
rising share of non-labour inputs, with the implication that the share of the rich is 
also perhaps rising i.e., personal income distribution is getting more unequal. The 
converse would be true if real wage grows faster than productivity.
16
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See, for example, the discussion in Atkinson (1997, 2009), Glyn (2009) and the 
references therein. 
16
 It should be noted that even though real wage data relate directly only to those who are 
employed for wages, the comparison between the real wage and productivity growth is 
relevant for a wider set of people, including the self-employed among the poor. Since the 
poor self-employed people would rely more on labour than on non-labour inputs in 
whatever enterprise they are engaged in, their fate will be inextricably linked to the fate 
of labour as a factor of production. Real wage can thus be seen as a proxy for the 
earnings for all those who rely mainly on the supply of labour for their livelihood, 
regardless of whether they are wage-employed or self-employed. 
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Let us first consider the productivity data. Growth of GDP can be 
decomposed into two components – namely, growth in labour input (i.e., 
employment) and growth in the productivity of labour (as measured by GDP per 
worker). Table VI presents this decomposition for three decades from 1980 to 
2010.  
TABLE VI 
DECOMPOSITION OF GDP GROWTH INTO  
EMPLOYMENT GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
(per cent) 
 
1981-1989 1989-2000 2000-2010 
Annual growth in real GDP 3.42 4.90   6.50 
Annual growth in employment 3.17 2.56   3.32 
Annual growth in labour productivity 0.25 2.34   3.18 
Share of productivity in GDP growth 7.30 47.8 48.90 
Notes: (1) The choice of years is dictated by the availability of employment data, which 
are given by the periodic Labour Force Surveys. 
(2) Growth in labour productivity (GDP per worker) is measured as the difference 
between growth of GDP and growth of employment. 
Source: Calculated from GDP data as given in Bangladesh Economic Review (various 
years) and employment figures as given in Labour Force Surveys (various 
years). 
It is noteworthy that the relatively slow growth that occurred in the 1980s 
came almost entirely from employment growth, with very little contribution 
coming from productivity growth. Only about 7 per cent of GDP growth could be 
attributed to productivity growth. By contrast, after the onset of the growth spurt 
in the 1990s, productivity growth has contributed nearly half of the GDP growth. 
The relatively high growth performance of the last couple of decades has thus 
clearly been driven by a sharp improvement in labour productivity. 
For the purpose of distributional analysis, the pertinent question is how has 
the benefit of productivity growth been shared by labour and non-labour factors 
of production. The answer can be found in Table VII, where we present data on 
the growth of real wage alongside the growth of labour productivity in the last 
three decades.
17
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Some comments are in order regarding the methodology of estimating real wages. The 
Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS) publishes a long time series of nominal wage 
index for the economy as a whole and also provides a corresponding series of real wage 
by deflating the nominal wage indices by what it describes as a cost-of-living index for 
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TABLE VII 
REAL WAGE GROWTH AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH 
(per cent per annum) 
 
Nominal 
wage 
Food 
CPI 
Real 
wage 
GDP per 
worker 
1981-1989 12.43 9.52 2.91 0.25 
1989-2000 5.44 5.31 0.13 2.34 
2000-2010 8.94 8.17 0.77 3.18 
Sources: Data on nominal wage and food CPI are taken from Statistical Yearbooks of various 
years and data on the growth of GDP per worker (labour productivity) are taken 
from Table VI above. 
The contrast between the 1980s and the subsequent growth-spurt period is 
quite remarkable. In the 1980s, when productivity growth was barely positive 
real wage increased at the healthy rate of almost 3 per cent. By contrast, in the 
1990s, when the growth spurt began and productivity growth jumped to 2.3 per 
cent, there was hardly any growth in real wage at all – just over 0.1 per cent per 
annum. This implies that the benefit of productivity growth, which was driving 
the growth spurt, was being enjoyed mostly by the owners of non-labour inputs, 
i.e., the richer segment of the society. As we have seen, that is when income 
                                                                                                                         
industrial workers. There are, however, a couple of problems with this real wage data. 
First, the cost-of-living index is based on the workers‟ consumption pattern of 1969-70, 
which is hardly likely to represent current pattern of consumption. Second, and perhaps 
because of the first reason, BBS has stopped publishing real wages indices after 2005-06. 
An alternative procedure would be to apply the national-level consumer price indices 
(CPI), which, unlike the workers‟ cost-of-living index, has been kept up-to-date through 
periodic revisions of the base year i.e., by incorporating changing patterns of 
consumption. But the problem with CPI for the present purpose is that it is based on the 
consumption pattern of the average household, which may be quite different from the 
consumption pattern of workers who belong mostly to the poorer households while an 
average household is currently well above the poverty line. As a more defensible 
strategy, we have chosen to deflate the nominal wage indices by national food price 
indices, since expenditure on food accounts for by far the largest part of consumption 
expenditure by poorer households. While constructing a consistent series of food price 
indices, we have taken due note of the fact that following the latest revision of base year 
from 1995-96 to 2005-06 inflation in recent years appears to be somewhat higher than 
what had seemed to be the case with the old base year. An additional issue is that using 
food price indices as the deflator is admittedly not an ideal strategy since non-food prices 
matter too. It is reassuring to note, however, that our food price indices correspond quite 
closely to a basic-needs cost-of-living index calculated for recent years by Zhang et al. 
(2013) from the Household Income and Expenditure Surveys by incorporating both food 
and non-food prices relevant for poorer households. 
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distribution began to become unequal in Bangladesh. There was some 
improvement in the 2000s when real wages increased at the rate of about 0.8 per 
cent per annum. But this was still far below the productivity growth of 3.2 per 
cent. This means that even though labour was claiming a slightly higher share of 
output per worker than before, the owners of non-labour inputs were still 
claiming a much larger share than labour, thus continuing the trend of rising 
inequality. It is this gain of non-labour relative to labour that is reflected in the 
rising Palma ratio (the ratio of income shares between the top 10 per cent and the 
bottom 40 per cent of the population) observed earlier. 
To understand the processes underlying these data, consider first the 
experience of the 1980s when real wage was growing at a healthy rate despite the 
absence of any significant growth in labour productivity. This was in fact a 
phenomenon of “catch-up growth.” During the economic slump that followed the 
Liberation War, real incomes of the people of Bangladesh had actually gone 
down below the pre-Independence level. Per capita income of the population as a 
whole was restored to the pre-Independence level only in the early 1980s, but 
real wage took somewhat longer to recover fully. It was only around 1990 that 
real wage had come back to the 1969-70 level. The growth of real wage that we 
observe in the 1980s is, therefore, simply a case of making up the lost ground on 
the part of labour that was made possible by successful recovery and 
reconstruction of the economy in the first two decades after Independence. 
What we observe in the two subsequent decades is a classic example of 
Arthur Lewis‟s surplus labour model in operation. Economic growth moved on to 
a higher trajectory in the 1990s, riding on the shoulder of rapid productivity 
growth, and although the demand for labour increased as a result, real wages 
hardly moved because of the presence of a large pool of surplus labour. And 
there was no catch-up growth either because the process of catching up had 
already been completed by 1990. As a result, income distribution moved 
inexorably in favour of the rich.  
Real wages rose somewhat faster in the 2000s, probably reflecting the fact 
that the labour market was getting tighter as the pool of surplus labour was 
finally being reduced by a significant amount. This is confirmed by a 
disaggregated study of real wages based on data from Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys (Zhang et al. 2013). The study has found that rural wages 
actually rose faster than urban wages during the two decades from 1990. More 
significantly, rural wages began to go up before urban wages, which is precisely 
the sequence one would expect to observe when surplus labour begins to shrink 
(Basu 1997). If surplus labour shrinks further and labour market gets tighter, one 
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can expect real wages to rise even faster, and if this happens at a pace faster than 
productivity growth, the trend of rising income inequality could be reversed at 
some point in the future. But the economy of Bangladesh has not quite reached 
that stage yet. 
The fact that over the last two decades real wage growth has lagged behind 
productivity growth not only helps explain the trend of rising inequality, it also 
goes a long way towards explaining the high growth performance of this period. 
From the producers‟ point of view, the consequence of real wage lagging behind 
productivity is that the real cost of production goes down. In a globalized 
economy, this is translated as a competitive advantage in the export market – in 
technical jargon, by causing a depreciation of the real exchange rate. To a large 
extent, it is this cost advantage that has spurred the remarkable export 
performance of Bangladesh in garments and more recently in some other sectors 
as well, which in turn has played a big role in bringing about the growth spurt 
since the 1990s. High growth and rising inequality can thus be seen as two sides 
of the same coin – the coin being the process whereby the growth of real wage 
has been kept well below the growth of labour productivity. The existence of 
surplus labour has certainly played a role in sustaining this process, but it may 
also have been supported by anti-labour institutional arrangements that have 
served to curb the powers of trade unions and to permit lax implementation of 
minimum wage laws. 
In addition to the dynamics of real wage and productivity, another factor that 
has helped create a positive association between growth and inequality is the 
emergence of workers‟ remittance as a major feature of Bangladesh‟s economy. 
Directly, remittance amounts to more than 10 per cent of GDP but its indirect 
contribution would be much bigger as the spending of remittance income by the 
recipient households generates further income through linkage effects. But even 
as remittance contributes to growth, it also serves to widen income inequality. 
According to a recent study, foreign remittance happens to be the single most 
important factor aggravating inequality in rural Bangladesh, followed by 
increasing share of income from non-farm enterprises (Osmani and Sen 2011).
18
 
The inequalising effect of foreign remittance stems simply from the fact that the 
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For more detailed analysis of the relative contributions of different components of 
income towards the creation of inequality over the years, see Khan and Sen (2001), Khan 
(2005), Osmani et al. (2006) and Bhattacharya and Khan (2008). 
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initial cost of sending workers abroad is quite high and it is mainly the relatively 
better off households who can afford it. 
It is thus fair to conclude that it is the very process of growth which 
Bangladesh has experienced in the last two decades that has led to higher 
inequality. While trying to think about the mechanisms through which growth 
can be linked to equity, it must be acknowledged first that the question of 
reversing the essentials of the growth process does not arise. The export-oriented 
growth process must be allowed not just to continue but to prosper, and greater 
earning of foreign remittance must be encouraged, not discouraged, if we are to 
maintain the growth momentum. The key to equitable growth must lie in 
ensuring that the fruits of this growth process are enjoyed more equitably by a 
broad spectrum of the population. For this to be possible, a two-pronged strategy 
must be employed. First, an effective social protection system must be put in 
place to help those who may be bypassed or even impoverished by the growth 
process. Second, conditions must be created so that people from the currently 
disadvantaged segments of the society are able to seize the employment 
opportunities opened up by the growth process just as much if not more than 
those coming from the privileged background. 
The two strategies are supposed to operate, however, on two different time 
horizons. The first strategy – social protection – has an immediate focus. It stems 
from the recognition that the structural changes brought about by any growth 
process will inevitably create winners and losers, and when the losers happen to 
belong to the more disadvantaged segments of the society, it is a moral duty of 
the rest of the society to share their gains with those who have been left out. An 
effective social protection system would mitigate to some extent the current 
inequities created by the growth process. 
The second strategy has a longer term focus and is meant to prevent future 
inequities. The logic of this strategy lies in the recognition that the best way of 
making growth equitable is to ensure that the opportunities for gainful 
employment created by the growth process remain open in an equitable manner 
so that the poor and the marginalised people can seize these opportunities as 
much as others. The problem, however, is that currently the opportunities are not 
equitably open, for the simple reason that people from the marginalised 
background do not have the physical and human capital necessary to seize the 
opportunities.
19
 Whatever new opportunities are being created are being taken up 
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 For a recent assessment of some aspects of inequality in opportunities in Bangladesh, 
see World Bank (2012). 
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mainly by those who are already from the privileged background. For growth to 
be equitable in the future, current inequity in the access to opportunities must be 
removed, and this can only be done by equipping the underprivileged with 
necessary resources.
20
  
Here, resources should be interpreted broadly to mean both physical and 
human capital, but it must also be acknowledged that the constraints to 
expanding access to the two types of resources may vary greatly. Providing 
equitable access to land and other physical assets through directly redistributive 
measures is bound to be fraught with serious practical difficulties involving 
issues of property rights. An alternative mechanism of broadening access to 
resources is to take measures that overcome credit market imperfections and 
ensure access to credit for all, as acknowledged in the emerging enthusiasm for 
inclusive finance. Broad-based access to credit will allow the currently asset-poor 
people to acquire access to land (through reverse tenancy, for example) and other 
physical assets required for pursuing non-farm activities, without confronting the 
property rights issues. This is already happening to some extent through the 
expansion of microfinance, which has enabled millions of poor people access to 
productive assets and thereby led to a much greater equity in access to resources 
than any redistributive measure could possibly achieve.
21
 But microfinance, by 
its very micro nature, can help only up to a point. For equity in access to 
resources to occur in a really substantial way, the poor people must find greater 
access to the formal financial sector. A great deal of work remains to be done in 
this area. 
A much greater potential exists for improving access to human capital 
through redistributive measures. This strategy necessarily has a longer time 
frame than that of social protection since development of human capital takes 
time – actions must start at a very early stage of life and continue well into 
adulthood. But if steps are taken today to remove inequities in the access to 
human capital, it will create the condition in the future for equitable sharing of 
the benefits of growth. Broad-based development of human capital is, therefore, 
the necessary precondition for equitable growth; this is the lesson from East Asia 
in the 1960s and 1970s and from Latin America in the 2000s. Equitable 
development of human capital will not only allow more equitable sharing of 
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See Osmani (2006) for an elaboration of this argument. 
21
See the evidence on pro-poor distribution of microfinance presented in Khalily and 
Khaleque (2013). 
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future growth, but will also promote growth itself, especially as the future growth 
process will inevitably be more skill-intensive than has been the case so far.
22
  
It is, therefore, necessary to evaluate how Bangladesh has been performing in 
terms of social protection on the one hand and equity in the formation of human 
capital on the other. This evaluation is undertaken in the following three sections 
– first in the sphere of social protection, followed by two major aspects of human 
capital, namely, health and education. 
IV. THE REACH AND EQUITY OF SOCIAL PROTECTION 
There are currently a bewildering variety of social protection programmes 
(SPP) in Bangladesh, administered by a plethora of government agencies but 
mostly in an uncoordinated manner.
23
 According to a recent count, there were 95 
programmes under 30 different ministries/agencies but only a few of them were 
of any significant size (GOB 2014, p.7). About a dozen programmes dominate 
the whole system, accounting for more than 70 per cent of spending and 
beneficiaries. 
There is, however, a serious mismatch between programmes that dominate in 
terms of funding and programmes that dominate in terms of beneficiaries. In 
terms of funding, by far the largest programme is the government pension 
scheme, which accounts for nearly a quarter of total budget but covers only about 
0.5 per cent of all beneficiaries. Open Market Operations, which is the second 
largest programme in terms of funding, has a much larger reach accounting for 
28 per cent of beneficiaries, but like the pension scheme this too is a broad-based 
programme rather than a targeted one aimed specifically at protecting the poor 
and the vulnerable. The major targeted schemes, such as the Vulnerable Group 
Feeding Programme, the Gratuitous Relief Food Programme, the Primary and 
Secondary School Stipend Programmes, and the Economic Empowerment of the 
Poor Programme, etc., receive only 21 per cent of total budget even though they 
together cover almost 70 per cent of all beneficiaries. 
                                                 
22
Both in the export of goods and services and export of manpower - the two main drivers 
of the growth process so far - it will be essential to move up the skill ladder if Bangladesh 
is to benefit more from the process of globalisation. 
23
A valuable recent contribution is a strategy paper prepared by the Bangladesh Planning 
Commission (GOB, 2014). Other major contributions include Ahmed et al. (2009), 
Khuda (2011), Morshed (2009), Rahman and Chaudhury (2012), Rahman et al. (2012, 
2014) and World Bank (2006b, 2013a). 
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The paucity of allocation for targeted programmes is compounded by low 
overall level of spending on social protection. The allocation for Social 
Protection Programmes (SPPs) has actually increased in recent years, but the 
improvement has occurred from a very low base. From a mere 1.3 per cent of 
GDP in 1998, spending on social protection went up to 2.5 per cent in 2011-12. 
Over the next couple of years, however, it came down to around 2.2 per cent of 
GDP, amounting to 12 per cent of total government spending. Low as it is, the 
contribution of this spending towards the well-being of the poor and vulnerable 
population is even lower because of the imbalance between targeted and non-
targeted programmes mentioned earlier. 
Exactly how low this contribution is can be gauged from a recent study of the 
reach and impact of social protection in rural Bangladesh (Osmani et al., 2015; 
chapter 7).
24
 The transfer income received from social protection schemes 
accounted for less than one per cent of total household expenditure of an average 
household and 2.7 per cent for an average beneficiary household in 2010. Going 
beyond the average and considering the poorer groups alone, the picture 
improves only slightly. In the rural population as a whole, the extreme poor 
households were able to finance only 2.2 per cent of their household expenditure 
by income from safety net programmes and moderate poor households only 1.5 
per cent. Even among the beneficiary households, the contribution of safety net 
to household expenditure was only about 4 per cent for the extreme poor and 3.4 
per cent for the moderate poor (Table VIII). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
24
 This study is based on a nationally representative sample survey of 6,300 rural households 
carried out by the Institute of Microfinance (InM) in 2010 under the guidance of the present 
author as part of a project entitled The Dynamics of Poverty in Rural Bangladesh. Even 
though this study is focussed only on rural areas, it provides a broad enough assessment of the 
social protection system as a whole since the system itself is oriented predominantly towards 
the rural sector. For example, in 2010 about 30 per cent of rural households benefitted from 
social protection as compared with only 9 per cent of urban households according to the 
official Household Income and Expenditure Survey (BBS 2012). It may be noted that 
according to the InM study, rural coverage was slightly higher in the same year – at 37 per 
cent; the difference between the two estimates probably stems from the difference in the list of 
programmes covered in the two surveys. 
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TABLE VIII 
CONTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL SAFETY NET TO HOUSEHOLD 
EXPENDITURE BY ECONOMIC STATUS IN RURAL BANGLADESH: 2010 
(Benefit as % of household consumption expenditure) 
Poverty group Beneficiary 
households 
All rural 
households 
   Extreme poor 4.05 2.19 
   Moderate poor 3.39 1.49 
   Marginally non-poor 3.47 1.47 
   Well off 1.94 0.50 
   Total 2.67 0.84 
Source: Osmani et al. (2015), Chapter 7. 
A positive feature of the social protection system is that it is mildly 
progressive in the incidence of spending. One aspect of progressivity is evident 
from Table VIII, which shows that poorer households finance a slightly higher 
percentage of their expenditure from safety net income in comparison with better 
off households. Another aspect of progressivity is found in the percentage of 
households covered – i.e., the poorer groups are covered relatively more than the 
richer groups. Thus, while 53 per cent of the extreme poor households had access 
to some type of safety net programme or the other in 2010, the rate of access 
declined to 45 per cent for the moderate poor, and to 29 per cent for the well-off 
(Figure 1).  
Figure 1: Access to Safety Net by Economic Status (% of beneficiaries in 
each group) 
 
 Source: Osmani et al. (2015), Chapter 7. 
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The progressivity of incidence does not ensure, however, that the major part 
of social protection spending goes to the poor – on the contrary. As can be seen 
from Table IX, the non-poor groups, comprising the well-off and marginally non-
poor households, accounted for roughly 60 per cent of both beneficiaries and 
money offered by the social protection programmes in 2010. The well-off group 
alone accounted for 46 per cent of all beneficiaries and 43 per cent of funds.
25
  
TABLE IX 
DISTRIBUTION OF BENEFITS OF SAFETY NET PROGRAMMES  
BY ECONOMIC STATUS IN RURAL BANGLADESH: 2010 
Poverty group 
Share of beneficiary 
households 
(%) 
Share of 
total funds  
received 
(%) 
   Extreme poor   24.5   25.6 
   Moderate poor   15.1   14.8 
   Marginally non-poor   14.6   16.6 
   Well off   45.8   42.9 
   Total 100.0 100.0 
Source: Osmani et al. (2015), Chapter 7. 
When a small amount of fund is distributed so heavily in favour of those who 
need protection the least, it should come as no surprise that the social protection 
system should fail to achieve its objective of providing protection to those who 
need it the most. Two types of evidence are offered below to illustrate this 
failure. 
First, we ask whether the social safety net system has helped reduce poverty 
of rural households. A simple approach to answering this question is to do a 
simulation by subtracting social security contribution from household‟s 
consumption expenditure and then calculating poverty rates with these adjusted 
                                                 
25
Distribution of benefits happens to be perverse in spite of the fact, as noted above, that 
the incidence of benefit is distinctly progressive (i.e., the percentage of beneficiaries is 
higher among the poorer groups) and per household benefit is also mildly progressive. 
The reason for this apparent paradox lies in the difference in absolute numbers. The non-
poor groups are much larger in size in terms of number of households – some 70 per cent 
of rural households belong to these groups. So even with slightly lower percentage of 
beneficiaries and per household benefit, the total amount of benefit accruing to these 
groups turns out to be much larger than the benefit accruing to the poorer groups. 
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consumption levels. This will give us a counterfactual poverty rate for the 
scenario without any social protection. Comparison of this counterfactual poverty 
rate with the actual poverty rate will then show the contribution of social 
protection towards poverty reduction. The results of this exercise are presented in 
Table X. It may be seen that without the contribution of social safety net rural 
poverty would have been higher but only marginally - by about one percentage 
point in the case of overall poverty and one and a half percentage points in the 
case of extreme poverty.
26
 
TABLE X 
COMPARISON OF RURAL POVERTY WITH AND WITHOUT 
SOCIAL PROTECTION: 2010 
(Headcount poverty ratio: per cent) 
Poverty 
With social 
protection 
Without social 
protection 
Overall poverty 33.1 34.4 
Extreme poverty 19.9 21.4 
Note: The poverty rate without protection is calculated after subtracting social safety net 
transfer from a household‟s consumption expenditure. 
Source: Osmani et al. (2015), Chapter 7. 
Secondly, we examine the safety net‟s contribution towards improving the 
ability to cope with periodic shocks. If a system of social protection is to serve 
the goal of protection in any meaningful sense, it ought to be able to help 
households cope better with shocks. One measure of how well a household is 
able to cope is to check what kind of coping strategy they happen to use when 
faced with shocks. Two types of coping strategies may be distinguished for this 
purpose – erosive or non-erosive strategies. Erosive strategy, as the name 
suggests, erodes the resource base of the household – for example, when it draws 
down past savings or sells some assets to meet a crisis. Non-erosive strategy, on 
the other hand, is employed when the household seeks to meet the crisis without 
depleting the resource base – for example, by borrowing money, working harder, 
or migrating to places where work is available. Clearly, erosive mechanisms 
involve potentially greater cost to the household economy over the longer term as 
assets once sold are very difficult to retrieve even in good times. It stands to 
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This tiny contribution pales in comparison with the substantial contributions made by 
both microcredit and foreign remittance, which are in the range of 20 to 30 per cent. See, 
Osmani et al. (2015), chapter 8. 
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reason, therefore, that households would try to avoid such strategies as far as 
possible, and get by with the non-erosive ones to the extent possible. The extent 
to which they are actually able to do so would depend to a large degree on the 
external support they receive – for example, support from the social safety net. 
One way of assessing the effectiveness of the social protection system, therefore, 
is to find out how far it has enabled shock-stricken households to avoid erosive 
coping mechanisms. 
Using the InM dataset for 2010, econometric estimation showed that, after 
controlling for other factors, access to social safety net had no effect on a 
household‟s ability to avoid erosive coping. By contrast, access to microcredit 
made a significant contribution in this regard by enabling households to choose 
non-erosive coping (Osmani et al. 2015). Evidently, the social protection system 
as it currently operates in rural Bangladesh fails in one its most important 
functions – namely, to enable the beneficiaries to cope with shocks better. 
Thus, whichever way we look at the effect of social protection – whether in 
its effect on poverty or in its ability to help households cope with crises better – 
its contribution has been negligible. This is a consequence partly of low financial 
allocation made to the targeted schemes that are supposed to protect the poor and 
the vulnerable and partly of the fact that even this small allocation is appropriated 
mostly by the better off households. Evidently, the existing social protection 
system in Bangladesh is thoroughly inadequate to mitigate the current inequities 
that are being generated by the growth process. 
V. EQUITY IN HEALTH OUTCOMES 
Bangladesh‟s achievement on the health front has been widely acclaimed. As 
measured by the indicators of health outcomes such as life expectancy and child 
mortality as well as indicators of health services such as coverage of 
immunization, Bangladesh outperforms most other developing countries at 
similar or even higher levels of per capita income.
27
 All this is well-known; what 
is less well-known, however, is the extent of inequality in health outcomes and 
health services prevailing in Bangladesh and how it is changing over time. We 
present below some evidence in this regard based on the data in Demographic 
and Health Surveys (DHS). Since the 1993 survey, DHS has collected data on 
different types of household assets which has allowed the construction of a 
wealth index of households and thus enabled classification of data by wealth 
                                                 
27
This phenomenon has recently been analysed intensively by Mahmud (2008), Drèze 
and Sen (2013) and Asadullah et al. (2014). 
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quintiles.
28
 The analysis of health inequality presented below is based on this 
classification.
29
 We shall look at the trend in health inequality with regard to both 
children and women – children because they are the foundation on which future 
human capital will be built and women because women‟s health is a major 
determinant of children‟s health and thus of future human capital.  
First, we present data on children‟s nutritional status as measured by three 
indicators, namely, the proportion of children who are stunted (low height-for-
age), the proportion of children who are wasted (low weight-for-height) and the 
proportion of children who are underweight (low weight-for-age). Of these, the 
extent of stunting is the most appropriate indicator of long-term changes in 
nutritional status as wasting can capture the effects of short-run fluctuations in 
access to nutrition and healthcare, and so can underweight which shows the 
combined outcome of stunting and wasting. 
Malnutrition as measured by stunting and underweight has been a 
persistently serious problem in Bangladesh in the past - in fact in the whole of 
South Asia, where the level of malnutrition was found to be higher even that of 
sub-Saharan Africa which was economically more backward than South Asia in 
almost all respects. In the 1990s, this paradox was dubbed by the UNICEF as the 
“Asian Enigma.” Recent evidence shows that while the enigma still remains i.e., 
the rate of malnutrition in South Asia is still higher than that in sub-Saharan 
Africa,
30
 in absolute terms there has been a good deal of progress in reducing the 
magnitude of malnutrition in South Asia, including Bangladesh. As can be seen 
from Table XI, the extent of stunting has come down 55 per cent in 1996/97 to 
41 per cent in 2011 while the proportion of underweight children has declined 
from 56 per cent to 36 per cent during the same period. 
                                                 
28
 The early DHS reports (up to 2004) did not actually report health indicators by wealth 
status although the relevant data were collected. Thankfully, Gwatkin et al. (2000, 2007) 
used the unpublished raw data for the earlier years to present information on health 
indicators by wealth quintiles. We drew upon their data for the earlier years and DHS 
reports themselves for the later years. In addition to DHS, The Multiple Indicators 
Cluster Survey (MICS), carried out periodically by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics 
with the help of UNICEF, also collects data that permit classification of households 
according to wealth index, but published health data based on such classification are 
available only for 2006. As a result, the published MICS data cannot be used for 
analysing trend of inequality over time. 
29
 For an earlier analysis of health inequality based on this data, see Chowdhury and 
Osmani (2010). 
30
In 2011, the proportion of underweight children was 32 per cent in South Asia as 
against 21 per cent in sub-Saharan Africa, according to the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank. 
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It is disconcerting to note, however, that while the overall rate of 
malnutrition has declined, the same cannot be said about inequality in nutritional 
status between children from poorer and richer backgrounds. As measured by the 
ratio of the proportions of malnourished children in the poorest and richest 
wealth quintiles (henceforth called the quintile ratio), inequality in stunting 
increased from 1.8 in 1996/97 to 2.2 in 2004 and remained stubbornly around 
that ratio in the subsequent years. In other words, throughout the decade of the 
2000s, the incidence of stunting among children from the poorest quintile 
remained more than twice the incidence among children from the richest quintile. 
A very similar pattern obtains for inequality in the incidence of underweight. 
Thus, it is fair to conclude that there has been no decline in inequality in the 
nutritional status of children in the last one decade and a half; if anything, the gap 
between the poorest and the richest quintile has become somewhat wider today 
than it was in the mid-1990s. 
TABLE XI 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS IN THE NUTRITIONAL  
STATUS OF CHILDREN 
 NCHS 1977 GRS WHO 2006 GRS 
1996/97 2004 2007 2004 2007 2011 
Underweight (%) 
      
    All 56.3 47.5 46.3 43.0 41.0 36.4 
    Bottom quintile 65.2 59.3 55.5 55.6 50.5 50.3 
    Top quintile 37.6 30.2 31.7 25.9 26.0 20.9 
Ratio (bottom to top 
quintile) 
1.7 2.0 1.8 2.1 1.9 2.4 
Stunting (%)       
    All 54.6 43.0 36.2 51.0 43.0 41.3 
    Bottom quintile 61.4 54.4 46.2 62.2 54.0 53.7 
    Top quintile 34.8 25.0 21.1 30.5 26.3 25.7 
Ratio (bottom to top 
quintile) 
1.8 2.2 2.2 2.0 2.1 2.1 
Wasting (%)       
    All 17.7 12.8 16.2 15.0 17.0 15.6 
    Bottom quintile n.a. 15.5 20.2 17.7 20.8 17.5 
    Top quintile n.a. 9.4 11.3 11.1 13.2 12.1 
Ratio (bottom to top 
quintile) 
n.a. 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.4 
Note: Two different sets of estimates are provided as the methodology of measuring malnutrition 
changed in 2007 from the use of NCHS growth reference standard (GRS) to the WHO growth 
reference standard. There is overlap for some years because for those years DHS reports produced 
estimates by using both standards. 
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2007) and NIPORT et al. (2005, 2009, 2013). 
 
This conclusion does not change if we expand the set of indicators to include 
mortality and morbidity rates among children. Table XII presents the relevant 
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data for two mortality indicators – viz., infant mortality and under-five mortality, 
and three morbidity indicators – viz., prevalence of fever, prevalence of diarrhoea 
and prevalence of acute respiratory infection (ARI). For none of these indicators, 
there is a clear trend of decline in inequality as measured by the quintile ratio – 
either the ratio has fluctuated without showing any trend or it has increased 
slightly in recent years. The overall picture once again is one of persistent 
inequality despite significant progress made in reducing the average levels of 
morbidity and mortality among children. 
 
TABLE XII 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS IN CHILDHOOD  
MORTALITY AND MORBIDITY 
 
1996/97 1999/00 2004 2007 2011 
Infant mortality 
    
 
    All 82 72 65 52 43 
    Bottom quintile 97 93 90 66 50 
    Top quintile 57 58 65 36 29 
    Ratio (bottom to top quintile) 1.7 1.6 1.4 1.8 1.7 
Under-five mortality 
    
 
    All 116 95 88 65 53 
    Bottom quintile 141 140 121 86 64 
    Top quintile 76 72 72 43 37 
    Ratio (bottom to top quintile) 1.9 1.9 1.7 2.0 1.7 
Prevalence of fever (%) 
    
 
    All 31.0 37.2 40.2  36.5 
    Bottom quintile 31.6 39.7 42.6 38.9 40.7 
    Top quintile 30.0 35.3 37.7 34.8 29.0 
    Ratio (bottom to top quintile) 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.4 
Prevalence of diarrhoea (%) 
    
 
    All 7.6 6.1 7.5 9.8 4.6 
    Bottom quintile 8.8 6.3 8.7 10.2 5.5 
    Top quintile 6.4 6.4 6.1 8.1 4.4 
    Ratio (bottom to top quintile) 1.4 1.0 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Prevalence of acute respiratory infection (ARI) (%) 
    All 12.8 n.a. 19.3 13.0 5.8 
    Bottom quintile 12.7 n.a. 21.4 16.5 7.3 
    Top quintile 10.6 n.a. 14.1 8.1 5.1 
    Ratio (bottom to top quintile) 1.2 n.a. 1.5 2.0 1.4 
Notes: (1) Reference period for mortality is five years preceding the survey. 
(2) Absolute values of ARI data for 2011 are not comparable with earlier years because of 
definitional differences, but the ratio between quintiles may still be comparable. 
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2007) and NIPORT et al. (2005, 2009, 2013).  
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To probe a bit more deeply into the reasons for persistent inequality in health 
outcomes, we first looked at the levels of healthcare received by children and 
then at the status of women‟s health since both of these are important 
determinants of child health. For healthcare, a distinction was made between 
preventive and curative care and information on the two types of healthcare is 
presented separately in Tables XIII and XIV respectively. In Table XIII, two 
types of preventive healthcare are considered – full immunisation (comprising 
immunization against BCG, measles and DPT) and vitamin A supplementation. 
In both cases, great strides have been made at the aggregate level – the average 
rate of immunization has increased from 54 per cent in 1996/97 to 86 per cent in 
2011 and the rate of vitamin A supplementation has increased from 66 per cent in 
1996/97 to 88 per cent in 2007. But this admirable progress in the aggregate has 
not been accompanied by a similar improvement in the equity of healthcare. 
Inequality in healthcare has been measured here as the ratio of shortfall in the 
coverage of healthcare from the maximum possible coverage of 100 per cent.
31
 
According to this measure, the degree of inequality in the rate of immunisation 
has increased over time – from less than 2 in the 1990s to over 3 in 2011. 
Inequality in vitamin A supplementation also increased in the early years; it then 
seems to have declined sharply in 2007 but what has been happening since then 
remains to be seen. 
TABLE XIII 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS IN PREVENTIVE  
HEALTHCARE FOR CHILDREN 
 
1996/97 1999/00 2004 2007 2011 
Full basic immunisation (%)    
 
 
    All 54.2 60.4 73.3 81.1 86.0 
    Bottom quintile 47.4 50.3 57.5 79.9 76.8 
    Top quintile 66.6 74.9 86.7 88.4 93.5 
Ratio of shortfall 1.57 1.98 3.20 1.73 3.57 
Vitamin A supplementation (%) 
    
 
    All 66.8 73.3 81.8 88.3 --- 
    Bottom quintile 66.3 73.5 74.6 88.8 --- 
    Top quintile 76.3 83.1 83.5 90.0 --- 
Ratio of shortfall 1.42 1.57 1.54 1.12 --- 
Note: Vitamin A supplementation figures for 2011 are not presented because they not comparable with figures 
for earlier years as they relate to children aged 6-59 months as against 9-59 months in earlier surveys. 
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2007) and NIPORT et al. (2005, 2009, 2013). 
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Thus, if the coverage of a particular type of healthcare for the poorest and richest quintiles is 
denoted by hp and hr per cent respectively, the degree of inequality would be measured by the 
ratio (100 - hp)/(100 - hr). This is a better measure than the simple ratio of coverage (hp/hc) 
because when hp starts from a low base it is easier to get an improvement in the hp/hr ratio 
even though much of the incremental healthcare has gone to the richest quintile. Measuring 
the ratio of shortfalls from a maximum possible value avoids this problem. For a fuller 
discussion of this issue, see Chowdhury and Osmani (2010). 
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Turning now to the three measures of curative care, we once again find an 
impressive performance at the aggregate level but disappointing performance 
with regard to equity. As measured by the ratio of shortfalls in coverage as 
between the poorest and richest quintiles, there has been an unambiguous 
increase of inequality in the decade of the 2000s in comparison with the mid-
1990s (Table XIV). Thus, for example, the ratio of shortfall in the medical 
treatment of fever was 1.15 in 1996/97 but from 2004 to 2011 it varied between 
1.36 and 1.50; shortfall in the medical treatment of ARI also rose from 1.58 in 
1996/97 to the range of 1.60-2.07 in the later years.  
TABLE XIV 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS IN CURATIVE  
HEALTHCARE FOR CHILDREN 
 
1996/97 1999/00 2004 2007 2011 
Medical Treatment of fever (%)      
    All 18.9 23.8 18.0 23.9 27.0 
    Bottom quintile 15.0 17.0 8.9 13.3 22.3 
    Top quintile 26.1 44.1 39.1 38.7 42.8 
Ratio of shortfall 1.15 1.48 1.50 1.41 1.36 
Treatment of diarrhoea with ORT (%) 
    All 74.6 81.0 83.4 81.2 80.6 
    Bottom quintile 76.1 78.9 74.9 75.0 84.2 
    Top quintile 73.0 80.4 94.4 85.9 83.3 
Ratio of shortfall 0.89 1.08 4.48 1.77 0.95 
Medical Treatment of ARI (%)      
    All 32.9 n.a. 20.0 30.2 --- 
    Bottom quintile 23.0 n.a. 10.7 17.0 --- 
    Top quintile 51.3 n.a. 44.1 59.9 --- 
Ratio of shortfall 1.58 n.a. 1.60 2.07 --- 
Note: (1) ARI data for 2011 are not comparable with earlier years because of definitional 
differences. 
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2007) and NIPORT et al. (2009, 2013). 
Clearly, persistent and to some extent rising inequality in the access to 
healthcare has played a role in preventing inequality in child health outcomes 
from falling in the last decade and a half despite impressive expansion in 
healthcare coverage at the aggregate level. Evidence shows that apart from 
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inequities in healthcare inequity in women‟s health has also played a role in this 
regard. This is revealed by Table XV which presents data on the extent of 
malnutrition among ever-married women of reproductive age as measured by low 
BMI (body-mass index). Once again, performance at the aggregate level has been 
quite impressive, as the average rate of malnutrition has come down from 56 per 
cent in 1996/97 to 24 per cent in 2011. The problem, however, is that the rate of 
progress has been a lot slower for poorer women as compared with richer 
women. As a result, the quintile ratio of the degree of women‟s malnutrition has 
increased steadily over the years – rising from 2.0 in 1996/97 to 4.8 in 2011.  
As in the case of child health, rising inequality in women‟s health has gone 
hand in hand with rising inequality in the access to healthcare. Data on three 
measures of healthcare for women are presented in Table XVI–viz., ante-natal 
care visits to a medically trained person, iron supplementation, and delivery 
attended by a medically trained person. For each type of healthcare, we have 
measured inequality by the ratio of shortfalls from the maximum possible 
coverage of 100 per cent (as in the case of child healthcare). The data show that 
while the aggregate coverage of women‟s healthcare has improved considerably 
since the mid-1990s, the extent of inequity in coverage has also increased at the 
same time, for each type of healthcare. The rise in inequality is especially severe 
in the case of ante-natal care, for which the ratio of shortfall between the poorest 
and richest quintiles has increased from 2.2 in 1996/97 to 5.5 in 2011. 
TABLE XV 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS IN THE  
NUTRITIONAL STATUS OF WOMEN 
(per cent) 
Undernutrition (BMI<18.5) 1996/97 2004 2007 2011 
    All 52.0 34.3 29.7 24.2 
    Bottom quintile 64.5 44.0 43.4 40.1 
    Top quintile 32.6 14.7 13.4 8.4 
    Ratio (bottom to top quintile) 2.0 3.0 3.2 4.8 
Note: Ever married women aged 15-49 years. 
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2007) and NIPORT et al. (2005, 2009, 2013). 
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TABLE XVI 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DIFFERENTIALS IN MATERNAL CARE 
(per cent) 
 
1996/97 1999/00 2004 2007 2011 
Ante-natal care visits to a medically trained person 
    All 29.0 33.4 48.8 51.7 54.7 
    Bottom quintile 16.0 19.4 24.9 30.8 30.3 
    Top quintile 62.3 69.8 81.1 83.5 87.4 
    Ratio of shortfall 2.23 2.67 3.97 4.19 5.53 
Iron Supplementation      
    All … 36.4 50.0 54.8 … 
    Bottom quintile … 21.2 31.6 38.9 … 
    Top quintile … 62.8 76.1 75.9 … 
    Ratio of shortfall  2.12 2.86 2.54  
Delivery attended by a medically trained person  
    All 8.1 12.1 13.2 18.0 32.1 
    Bottom quintile 1.8 3.5 3.3 4.8 12.2 
    Top quintile 29.8 42.1 39.4 51.0 63.9 
    Ratio of shortfall 1.40 1.67 1.60 1.94 2.43 
Note: Ever married women aged 15-49 years with live births in the three years preceding 
the survey. 
Source: Gwatkin et al. (2007) and NIPORT et al. (2005, 2009, 2013). 
The evidence presented above depicts a rather grim picture. Inequality in 
health outcomes has remained stubbornly high over the years and has actually 
increased in a number of dimensions. The reason lies in either increasing or 
persistent inequities in the distribution of healthcare for children and increasing 
inequity in women‟s health outcomes, the two major determinants of children‟s 
health. Clearly, the current trends must be reversed if equity is to be linked with 
growth in the future on the foundation of an equitable distribution of the health 
component of human capital. 
VI. EQUITY IN EDUCATION 
Access to education, especially at the primary and secondary levels, has 
increased in a very impressive manner over the last few decades. Between 1975 
and 2010, the number of primary schools more than doubled, as did the number 
of teachers. Along with this expansion of facilities, net enrolment rates at the 
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primary level increased from 53 per cent in 1975 to 95 per cent in 2010. The 
country is, however, still far from ensuring universal coverage of primary 
education because drop-out remains a serious problem.
32
 
The significant increase in enrolments at primary level since the 1980s has 
spilled over to higher enrolment at the secondary level in the 1990s, which more 
than doubled between 1990 and 2010. Yet, enrolment at the secondary level 
remains quite low - around 37 per cent at the national level in 2011. The problem 
of low enrolment is compounded by very poor survival rates. A study in the late 
1990s found that for every 100 students who entered the secondary school system 
at grade six, only 60 advanced to the second year and a meagre six of them 
survived through passing the final examination at the higher secondary level, 
which is a pre-condition for continuing with higher education (CAMPE 1999). In 
some respects, the survival rate has got worse over time. For instance, in 1999, of 
those who entered the 6th grade some 31 per cent survived the examination in 
grade 10, but in 2008 only 20 per cent did so (CAMPE 2009). 
Going beyond aggregate levels of enrolment and survival, equity in access is 
also important in shaping the inclusiveness in education. Perhaps the most 
satisfying aspect in this regard is the achievement of gender parity at the primary 
level and significant reduction of the gender gap at the secondary level. In 1970, 
net enrolment of girls at the primary level was only half of that of boys – 33 per 
cent as compared with 66 per cent. By the end of the 1990s, the enrolment rates 
had become virtually equal – at 82 and 84 per cent respectively. By 2009, girls 
had overtaken the boys with a net enrolment of 94 per cent compared with 88 per 
cent for boys. In recent years, girls have overtaken boys even in secondary 
enrolment as well. 
Gender apart, in most other respects disparities in educational attainment 
remain a major concern. Significant disparity still persists between urban and 
rural areas, and between the poor and the non-poor. The „rural-urban divide‟ is 
reflected partly in variations in the type of primary schools that the students 
attend. Most of the rural students (around 92 per cent) are enrolled in government 
and government subsidised schools and madrasahs, while in the urban areas 
students have greater access to private schools. A distinction needs to be made, 
however, between urban slums and non-slum urban areas. A nationwide survey 
carried out by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in 2006 found that children 
from urban slums performed even worse than rural children in terms of 
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According to official statistics, the drop-out rate from primary schools was about 40 per 
cent in 2010 (Statistical Yearbook 2011). 
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completion rates at the primary level and transition to secondary level (Table 
XVII).  
TABLE XVII 
DISPARITY IN EDUCATIONAL OUTCOMES BY LOCATION 
(per cent) 
Location 
Net primary completion 
rate 
Transition to secondary 
level 
   Rural 43.8 88.3 
   Urban 53.6 91.3 
       Urban non-slum 53.8 93.2 
       Urban slum 32.5 84.5 
Source: BBS (2007b). 
The problem with urban slums is symptomatic of a much wider problem of 
disparities in the educational achievement across economic status. These 
disparities are much less discussed in Bangladesh as compared with gender 
disparities or the urban-rural divide. One reason is the relative lack of data. While 
the official statistics on educational progress often provides disaggregated data 
across gender and along the rural-urban divide, they seldom reveal disparities 
across economic status. There are, however, a number of alternative sources from 
which one obtains a picture of these disparities; these include the regular 
Household Income and Expenditure Surveys (HIES) carried out by BBS, the 
periodic Multiple Cluster Sample Surveys (MICS) also by BBS, the 
Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) carried out by Macro International with 
the help of local associates and Education Watch reports published by an 
advocacy group called the Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE). As 
discussed below, the synthetic picture on the equity in education that emerges 
from these sources is quite revealing. 
Economic disparities in education has many dimensions - for example, 
enrolment and completion rates at different levels of schooling, levels of 
competencies achieved, cost of education, and so on. Let us begin with the most 
basic statistics - namely, attendance at different levels of education. Based on 
data from Demographic and Health Surveys, Table XVIII shows how the 
differential in attendance rates between children from the poorest and the richest 
wealth quintiles has changed in the last two decades.  
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TABLE XVIII 
TREND IN DISPARITIES IN ATTENDANCE RATES AT  
PRIMARY AND SECONDARY LEVELS 
 
1993 1996/97 1999/00 2004 2007 2011 
Primary net attendance rate 
(%)   
 
  
 
    Bottom quintile 56.69 64.04 63.40 73.84 80.18 77.24 
    Top quintile 82.42 84.59 80.87 87.53 85.10 82.21 
Percentage point 
difference 25.73 20.56 17.47 13.69 4.92 4.97 
Secondary net attendance rate (%)      
    Bottom quintile 3.50 8.79 9.60 11.05 18.42 20.27 
    Top quintile 49.06 48.07 52.54 53.21 50.32 47.29 
Percentage point 
difference 45.56 39.29 42.94 42.16 31.90 27.02 
Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data processed by World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2014. 
The most satisfying aspect of the picture presented by this table is the sharp 
decline in inequality in attendance at primary and secondary levels. In 1993, net 
attendance rate at the primary level for children from the poorest quintile was 
only 57 per cent as against 82 per cent for children from the richest quintile. By 
2011, the attendance rate for the richest quintile had remained virtually 
unchanged but the rate for the poorest quintile had progressed to 77 per cent, thus 
almost closing the gap with the richest quintile. Similar narrowing of the gap is 
observed for attendance at the secondary level as well albeit to a lesser extent. 
While for the richest quintile the net attendance rate at the secondary level 
hovered around 50 per cent throughout the two decades, for the poorest quintile it 
jumped from a very low 3.5 per cent in 1993 to 20 per cent in 2011. It is thus 
clear that the great progress that has been made in the last two decades in 
improving overall access to primary and secondary education has been 
accompanied by significant improvement in the equity to access. 
A more disaggregated view of the equity to access – separately for boys and 
girls – is presented in Figures 2 and 3, for primary and secondary levels 
respectively, based on data from the Multiple Indicators Cluster Survey (MICS) 
carried out by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics in 2006 (BBS 2007b). It is 
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evident that the degree of inequity was similar for boys and girls - there was no 
gender difference in the narrowing of gaps across economic status. The success 
that has been achieved in promoting girls‟ education in Bangladesh has not only 
enabled girls to close the gap with boys at primary and secondary levels, it has 
also enabled girls from the poorer households to narrow the gap with girls from 
richer households just as much as boys. 
Figure 2: Disparities in Net Attendance Rates (%) at Primary Level by 
Wealth Quintiles: 2006 
 
Source: Based on data in BBS (2007b). 
Figure 3: Disparities in Net Attendance Rates (%) at Secondary Level by 
Wealth Quintiles: 2006 
 
Source: Based on data in BBS (2007b). 
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But sadly this is where the good news ends. As we move beyond attendance 
to probe into disparities in performance, the picture is found to be much less 
encouraging. Disparities in one such measure of performance – namely, 
completion rate at the primary level – is shown in Figure 4. Completion rates are 
systematically lower for children from the poorer quintiles. For the poorest 
quintile, the completion rate (31 per cent) is almost half of that for the richest 
quintile (64 per cent). 
Figure 4: Disparities in Primary Completion Rate by Wealth Quintiles: 2006 
 
Source: Based on data in BBS (2007b). 
Yet another indicator of interest is the transition rate i.e., once the primary 
level is passed what percentage of students actually move on to the secondary 
level instead of dropping out. As revealed by Figure 5, for the transition rate too 
there is significant disparity across economic status, albeit not as pronounced as 
in primary completion rates. 
Figure 5: Disparities in Transition to Secondary Level by Wealth Quintiles: 2006 
 
Source: Based on data in BBS (2007b). 
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
30.7%
39.0%
46.7%
57.1%
64.4%
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5
82.1%
85.2%
89.6%
92.1%
94.4%
Osmani: The Growth-Equity Nexus in Bangladesh 45 
Going further beyond completion and transition, it is necessary to look at the 
disparities in performance as measured by various measures of quality of 
education. Some revealing information in this regard can be gleaned from the 
surveys carried out by CAMPE in its Education Watch Reports. In one of these 
reports, CAMPE measured the quality of education at the primary level by the 
number of competencies achieved by students from different backgrounds 
including their food security status, which can be used as a proxy for the 
economic status of households. As can be seen from Figure 6, the number of 
competencies achieved is systematically lower for the economically worse off 
households.
33
 
Figure 6: Number of Competencies Achieved at Primary Level by Food 
Security Status: 2008 
 
Source: Based on data in CAMPE (2008). 
In yet another Report, CAMPE measured the competency of students at 
grade 10 through a special test on Bangla, English, Mathematics and Everyday 
Science. Once again, the results reveal large disparities across economic status 
(Figure 7). Pass rates were found to be systematically lower for children from 
poorer background, and the disparity was particularly sharp for girls.  
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A more recent study, based on the official National Student Assessment 2011, confirms 
the continued existence of disparity in scores achieved at Grade 5 by students from 
poorer and richer backgrounds (World Bank, 2013b, Figure 6). 
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Figure 7: Pass Rate at Secondary Level by Food Security Status: 2007 
 
Source: Based on data in CAMPE (2007). 
The overall picture that emerges from above is that although disparity along 
economic status has all but disappeared in primary enrolment large disparities 
still remain in most other aspects of educational achievement. Thus, in secondary 
education, even though disparities have narrowed over time, the current level of 
disparity is still very high, with children from the poorest quintile having an 
attendance rate of less than half of that of children from the richest quintile; 
children from poorer backgrounds have much lower completion rates at the 
primary level and lower transition rate to the secondary level; and at both 
primary and secondary levels, poorer children fare much worse than their richer 
counterparts in terms of the quality of education achieved. 
More disturbingly, there are aspects of the educational scene where the 
disparities are actually becoming worse over time. This is especially true at the 
two ends of the educational spectrum – namely, at the pre-primary and post-
secondary levels. There has been a great deal of emphasis on pre-primary 
education of late as experience has shown that children who are exposed to some 
schooling at the pre-primary stage get a head start against the rest when 
education begins at earnest at the primary level. Moreover, evidence also shows 
that pre-primary education helps neutralise some of the disadvantage that 
children from poorer backgrounds tend to face, relative to children from the more 
privileged background, in acquiring educational skills at later stages of life. But 
this can only happen if the disadvantaged children get access to pre-primary 
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education at the same rate as the privileged children in the first place. 
Unfortunately, the very opposite seems to be happening in Bangladesh. Evidence 
presented by the Education Watch Report of 2013 shows that not only do the 
poorer children have lower enrolment at the pre-primary level than their richer 
counterparts, the gap between the two groups has actually been widening in the 
last decade and a half (CAMPE 2014). As can be seen from Table XIX, although 
enrolment has increased for all economic groups, the gap between the richest and 
poorest groups has widened from 8 percentage points in 1998 to 16 percentage 
points in 2013. 
TABLE XIX 
NET ENROLMENT IN PRE-PRIMARY EDUCATION 
(per cent) 
Food deficit status 1998 2005 2013 
Always in deficit 6.9 7.3 31.9 
Sometimes in deficit 9.2 12.2 34.3 
Breakeven 10.0 14.2 37.5 
Surplus 15.1 18.5 48.1 
All 9.3 13.4 40.4 
Source: CAMPE (2014). 
A similar widening of gap is observed at the other end of the spectrum. 
Contrary to primary and secondary education where, as we have seen, inequality 
in access has declined over time, post-secondary education is marked by 
increasing inequality. In 1993, a negligible proportion of children from the 
poorest wealth quintile were enrolled in post-secondary education; by 2011 the 
proportion increased marginally to 3.1 per cent. During the same period, 
enrolment for the wealthiest quintile increased from 29 per cent to 43 per cent, 
resulting in a substantial widening of the gap between the two groups (Table 
XX).
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The combined effect of narrowing inequality at the pre-secondary level and 
widening inequality at the post-secondary level is that disparity in the number of 
years of schooling among the 15-19 year-olds has hardly changed in the last two 
decades. Throughout this period, children from the wealthiest quintile have 
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A World Bank (2013b) study using data from the Household Income and Expenditure 
Surveys confirms that although there has been some decline in enrolment inequality at the 
primary and secondary levels in the decade of the 2000s, inequality has widened at the 
post-secondary level. 
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maintained an advantage of roughly four years of additional schooling in 
comparison with children from the poorest quintile (Table XX). 
TABLE XX 
TREND IN DISPARITIES IN ATTENDANCE RATES AT POST- 
SECONDARY LEVEL AND IN AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING 
 
1993 1996/97 1999/00 2004 2007 2011 
Post-secondary net 
attendance rate (%)   
 
  
 
    Bottom quintile 0.00 1.39 0.85 0.44 1.30 3.15 
    Top quintile 29.24 33.14 36.27 26.84 31.99 42.96 
Percentage point difference 29.24 31.74 35.42 26.40 30.68 39.80 
Average years of schooling by age group 15-19 years 
    Bottom quintile 3.55 4.62 4.00 4.39 5.12 5.33 
    Top quintile 8.37 8.78 8.87 8.25 8.53 9.68 
Absolute difference 4.82 4.16 4.87 3.86 3.41 4.35 
Source: Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) data processed by World Bank‟s World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 2014. 
There is a popular perception that one way for the children from poorer 
background to overcome their relative disadvantage is to move away from 
general education towards vocational training of various kinds which would 
presumably help them acquire the practical skills necessary for doing well in the 
labour market. The reality is very different, however. A recent study shows that it 
is the richer households who are represented relatively more in vocational 
training, for the simple reason that vocational training is more costly than general 
education (CAMPE 2013). 
Growing inequality in both pre-primary and post-secondary education are 
matters of serious concern. Higher inequality in pre-primary education suggests 
that the persistent inequality that we find in primary and secondary education in 
terms of educational outcomes (completion, competencies, etc.) will only be 
aggravated in the future. This, combined with growing inequality in post-
secondary education, will ensure that children from the poorer background will in 
future enter the labour market at an even greater disadvantage relative to children 
from well-off background than they do now. This disadvantage will be all the 
more serious as the economy moves on to a higher skill-base in the next phase of 
growth.  
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Just how serious the disadvantage might be can be gauged from a recent 
study which examined the rewards to education and skills in the labour market of 
Bangladesh (World Bank 2013b, Part III). Several findings are of particular 
interest in the present context. First, workers with higher levels of education are 
found proportionately more in occupations that pay more. Second, workers with 
lower levels of education are found more in the informal sector, and for any 
given level of education, the reward in the informal sector is less than in the 
formal sector. Thus, the less educated workers are doubly penalized - once 
through lower return for lower education, and again through a further reduction 
in return because of working in the informal sector. Third, in addition to the years 
of schooling, the quality of education also matters in getting a good job in the 
labour market. There is a clear positive correlation between the grades achieved 
and remuneration of the jobs offered by employers. Finally, the quantity and 
quality of education also matters for self-employed workers. Those who are more 
successful (in terms of poverty status) were found to have both longer years of 
schooling and greater literacy skills. 
These findings together imply that if current trend of widening inequality in 
educational outcomes is allowed to continue, thereby allowing the inequality in 
human capital to widen over time, it will be difficult to break the positive 
association between growth and inequality that we observe today. Linking 
growth with equity calls for a significant reform of the education system, 
especially education financing, aimed at achieving greater equity in educational 
outcomes, going beyond just equity in enrolment. 
Sadly, this is not happening at the moment – at least not in the required scale. 
For example, “The amount Bangladesh spends on education has remained 
relatively stable in the last 10 years, oscillating between 2.2 and 2.5 per cent of 
GDP over 2000–2008, while countries like India and Nepal have had ratios 
ranging from 3.1 to 4.4 per cent and 3.0 to 4.6 per cent, respectively, in the same 
period … The average public education spending of low-income countries is also 
consistently higher than that of Bangladesh over the last decade, at around 3.2–
3.7 percent” (World Bank 2013b, p.31). Furthermore, even the small amount of 
resources that are spent is not allocated equitably. A benefit incidence analysis of 
public expenditure on education shows that even in primary education, where the 
poor people have gained considerable access in the last two decades, some 26 per 
cent of benefit accrues to the richest quintile as compared with 17 per cent to the 
poorest quintile (World Bank 2013b, p.33). Obviously, at higher levels of 
education, where the poor are represented less, allocation of public resources 
would be even more inequitable. Reversing such inequities in public expenditure 
is an essential pre-condition for linking growth with equity in Bangladesh. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Bangladesh‟s transition to a higher growth trajectory since the early 1990s 
has been accompanied by increasing inequality of income. In particular, the gap 
between the richest ten per cent and the poorest forty per cent of the population 
has steadily widened while the middle half of the population has more or less 
retained control over about half of national income – a common enough pattern 
in most countries where income distribution is getting worse. Although the pace 
of growth has been rapid enough to bring about a substantial reduction in poverty 
despite rising inequality, the worsening of income distribution is still a matter of 
concern for at least two reasons – one intrinsic and the other instrumental. The 
intrinsic reason is that there is something inherently unfair and unjust in allowing 
the fruits of development to be confined to a tiny minority while depriving the 
majority who are poor. The instrumental reason is that higher inequality has the 
potential to dampen the pace of poverty reduction in the future by depressing 
future growth.
35
 
The positive association between growth and inequality has not occurred by 
coincidence. The two are in fact causally inter-twined – in the sense that the same 
processes that have led to rapid growth have also resulted in higher inequality. 
Two aspects of this causal connection have been emphasized in this paper. First, 
the period of rapid growth since the early 1990s has witnessed very slow growth 
in real wage – far below the growth of labour productivity. This has resulted, on 
the one hand, in reduced real cost of production, which has given Bangladesh a 
cost advantage in the global market, allowing its export industries to grow 
rapidly and to act as an engine of growth for the economy as a whole. On the 
other hand, slower growth of real wage relative to labour productivity has moved 
the functional distribution of income against labour and in favour of the owners 
of non-labour factors of production such as land and capital. Since labour input is 
supplied mostly by the poor people and non-labour inputs mostly by the rich, this 
anti-labour change in the functional distribution of income has also resulted in 
the widening of personal income distribution. The second element of the causal 
connection between growth and inequality is the role of foreign remittance. As 
the inflow of foreign remittance has become an increasingly prominent feature of 
Bangladesh economy, acting as an important driver of growth especially in rural 
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In fact, inequality can constrain future poverty reduction in two distinct ways - by 
reducing the rate of growth and by lowering the growth elasticity of poverty reduction 
i.e., by reducing the pace of poverty reduction for any given level of growth (Ravallion 
2005). 
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areas, it has also served to widen income inequality since it is mainly the 
relatively better off households who can afford to bear the initial cost of sending 
workers abroad. 
Thus in some important ways the transition to a higher growth path and 
worsening of income distribution are but two sides of the same coin - the coin 
being the very process of growth itself. It does not follow, however, that in order 
to achieve higher equity the current growth process must reversed. In fact, 
export-oriented growth process must be allowed not just to continue but to 
prosper, and greater earning of foreign remittance must be encouraged, not 
discouraged, if we are to maintain the growth momentum. Equitable growth must 
be achieved by ensuring that the fruits of this growth process are enjoyed more 
equitably by a broad spectrum of the population.  
For this to be possible, a two-pronged strategy must be employed. First, an 
effective social protection system must be put in place to help those who may be 
bypassed or even impoverished by the growth process. Second, conditions must 
be created so that people from the currently disadvantaged segments of the 
society are able to seize the opportunities opened up by the growth process – just 
as much if not more than those coming from the privileged background. An 
essential precondition for creating such equality of opportunity is to ensure 
equality in the distribution of human capital. The first prong of this strategy 
would help mitigate the current inequities that are emerging as a consequence of 
the growth process, while the second prong would improve future equity by 
enabling the children of the disadvantaged segments of the population to 
participate more fully in the growth process. 
The evidence presented in this paper suggests, however, that neither of these 
two prongs is working very well in Bangladesh. The social protection system is 
too small and the allocation of resources too perverse to make any significant 
impact on current inequities. There are also serious failures in enabling the 
currently disadvantaged segments of the society to seize the opportunities being 
opened up by the growth process. This is evident from the fact that inequality in 
human capital – as measured by differences in health and educational outcomes 
between poor and rich households – has either remained unchanged or increased 
in certain dimensions during the last two decades.  
The latter failure is especially worrying for two distinct reasons. The first 
reason for concern emanates from the possibility that this failure will sow the 
seeds of perpetuation of income inequality. This paper has argued that the recent 
trend of rising income inequality emerges from a growth process that is based on 
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the suppression of the growth of real wages. One would normally expect this 
trend to be reversed in the course of growth. As surplus labour gets exhausted 
and the skill base of the labour force is upgraded to meet the challenges of 
globalisation, real wages will have to grow faster in the future, thereby narrowing 
the gap in functional income distribution. There is a danger, however, that 
despite rising real wages inequality in personal income distribution may continue 
to grow because one source of inequality may replace another. Currently, the 
main source of inequality is the widening gap between the rewards to labour and 
non-labour factors of production. With rising real wages, this particular source of 
inequality may begin to wither away, but a new source might emerge as 
inequality grows between the rewards to skilled and unskilled labour. This is 
indeed what has happened in many middle-income developing countries in Latin 
America, and more recently in Asia, as they have attempted to grow rapidly 
riding on the wave of globalisation.
36
 Bangladesh may experience the same fate 
as it attempts to become a middle-income country. But it is important to 
recognise that this is not an inexorable fate. As the experience of Latin America 
in the decade of the 2000s shows, the trend of growing inequality between skilled 
and unskilled labour can be reversed, provided human capital can be developed 
on an equitable basis (Lopez-Calva and Lustig 2010, Lustig et al. 2011). This is 
where persistent inequalities in the access to human capital in Bangladesh 
become a matter of concern. As the demand for skilled labour rises in the next 
phase of growth, it is the children from the more privileged background who will 
mostly gain from it because of their superior human capital in comparison with 
children from the less privileged background. This will be a certain recipe for the 
perpetuation of income inequality. 
The second reason for concern has to do with the sustainability of the current 
growth process in Bangladesh. As has been argued in this paper, it will not make 
sense to try and reverse the current growth process even though the very same 
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The observed widening of rewards to skilled and unskilled labour in the developing 
world is in fact contrary to what one should expect according to the standard trade theory, 
as embodied for example in the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson theorem. This theorem 
predicts that as countries that are relatively more endowed with unskilled labour begin to 
globalise the relative reward to unskilled labour should rise and that of skilled labour 
should fall, thereby narrowing the gap in the rewards to skilled and unskilled labour. 
Exploring the reasons for this discordance between theory and evidence has been the 
subject of vigorous research in the last couple of decades worldwide. A number of 
possible explanations have been offered, including technological diffusion, firm 
heterogeneity and market imperfections. For a helpful introduction to this literature, see, 
inter alia, Davis and Mishra (2007) and Goldberg and Pavcnik (2007). 
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process has also led to rising inequality. But such an inequity-inducing growth 
process can only be sustained in a liberal democracy if the present generation 
feels that the current inequities are a price worth paying for the sake of equitable 
access to better standards of living in the future. In other words, people may 
accept some inequity today if they are hopeful that their children will enjoy a 
better life as its reward. But if inequities in the access to human capital continue 
to persist, those who are underprivileged today will have no reason to hope that 
things will be any better for their children when they grow up as citizens of the 
future. It will then be difficult to achieve a social consensus to tolerate some 
degree of inequity today for the sake of economic growth. This will jeopardise 
the very sustainability of the growth process that has so far served the 
Bangladesh economy reasonably well. 
For both these reasons, ensuring equity in human capital becomes an 
essential precondition for linking equity and growth in Bangladesh. This is quite 
apart from the fact that equity in health and education is desirable in itself as an 
essential component of broad-based human development. 
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